Ronald Arlen Trumbull appeals the district court’s order 1 affirming the denial of supplemental security income. Upon de novo review, we find that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports *573 the determination of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that Trumbull is not disabled. See Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 2013). As to Trumbull’s arguments for reversal, we conclude that (1) the ALJ’s credibility findings are entitled to deference, because the findings were based on multiple valid reasons, see McDade v. Astrue, 720 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2013); (2) the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC) determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record as whole, including the medical-treatment records, see Myers, 721 F.3d at 527 (8th Cir. 2013) (RFC determination is based on all relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own description of his limitations, and must be supported by some medical evidence); (3) further development of the record on Trumbull’s mental impairments was not required, because the information that had been developed allowed sufficient consideration of the impairments, see id. (ALJ was not required to supplement record with clarifications from treating sources, or with consultative examination, where no crucial issue required development); and (4) the hypothetical to the vocational expert captured the concrete consequences of Trumbull’s impairments, as determined by the ALJ, see Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 560-61 (8th Cir. 2011) (vocational expert’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence when it is based on hypothetical that accounts for all of claimant’s proven impairments). 2

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.