Brandon Scroggin appeals an order of the district court, 1 directing him to pay attorney’s fees as a sanction for deliberately misusing the judicial process. After careful review, we find no abuse of the district court’s broad discretion to sanction a party under its inherent powers. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (party’s deliberate misuse of judicial process was sanctionable under court’s inherent powers; amount of award was warranted by, inter alia, need to ensure abuses would not be repeated); Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 352 (8th Cir. 2003) (district court has broad discretion to decide appropriate sanctions); Lamb Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 103 F.3d 1422, 1435 (8th Cir. 1997) (inherent power depends on conduct during litigation, not on which party wins); see also Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 1175-76, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013) (district court has inherent power to award attorney’s fees, notwithstanding attorney’s fees provisions of Federal Debt Collection Practices Act).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.