Nhut Le and Chai M. Le appeal from the order of the District Court 1 dismissing their complaint. Following careful de novo review, we agree with the District Court that the Les’ complaint — which was devoid of factual allegations and contained only conclusory legal theories about improprieties surrounding the foreclosure sale of their home and the underlying loan-related documents — failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” (citation to quoted case omitted)); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard of review). We have considered the Les’ other arguments for reversal and find them to be without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.