Federal inmate Travis Correll appeals after the district court 2 dismissed his two pro se civil actions, in which he claimed that 18 U.S.C. § 3621, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, violate equal protection because they authorize early release only for nonviolent offenders who both have a history of substance abuse and complete a residential drug-abuse treatment program.

We conclude that the district court properly denied Correll’s habeas petition and dismissed his civil-rights action. See United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1076 (8th Cir. 2000); Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). “There is *663 no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). The government’s refusal to offer early release to Correll does not implicate a fundamental right, so § 3621 is permissible if it is supported by a rational basis. Congress rationally could have concluded that substance-abuse treatment for prisoners could help reduce the extraordinarily high rate of recidivism among offenders who have a history of substance abuse, and that an early-release incentive was necessary to draw into treatment inmates who might otherwise be unwilling to undergo drug treatment. See H.R.Rep. No. 103-320 (1993). The statute is thus supported by a rational basis. See Brikova v. Holder, 699 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.