In these consolidated matters, Angela Nails appeals from four orders issued by the district court, 1 each of which granted her motion to voluntarily dismiss her civil lawsuits. We conclude that Ms. Nails lacks standing to áppeal from the district court’s orders. See United States v. Northshore Min. Co., 576 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (standing is jurisdictional prerequisite for appeals); see also Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2009) (appellate courts are obligated to consider sua sponte jurisdictional issues, where it appears jurisdiction is lacking). When a district court dismisses a case without prejudice pursuant to a plaintiffs, voluntary request to do so, a plaintiff lacks standing to appeal except under limited circumstances which are not present in these cases. See Helm Fin. Corp. v. MNVA R.R., Inc., 212 F.3d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 2000) (in general, neither party may appeal from voluntary dismissal because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment); Belle-Midwest, Inc. v. Mo. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 56 F.3d 977, 978 (8th Cir. 1995) (generally, moving plaintiff may not appeal from order granting voluntary dismissal); Bowers v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 668 F.2d 369, 369 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (as a general *243 rule, no appeal by moving plaintiff will lie from order granting voluntary dismissal).

Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals.