Blondell Mitchell appeals after the District Court 1 dismissed her complaint that asserted claims against the defendants under the Lanham Act and Iowa state law. After de novo review, we conclude that dismissal was proper. See Plymouth Cty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 774 F.3d 1155, 1158 (8th Cir. 2014) (reviewing de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim); Nolles v. State Comm. for the Reorganization of Sch. Dists., 524 F.3d 892, 901 (8th Cir.) (reviewing de novo a “district court’s interpretation and application of state law”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 945, 129 S.Ct. 418, 172 L.Ed.2d 288 (2008). We first determine that Mitchell failed to state a claim under the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B) (describing claims for false description and false advertising); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1395, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014) (setting out the elements of a false-advertising claim). Further, Mitchell’s state-law claims were barred by Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations. See In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Iowa 2008) (noting that a two-year statute of limitations applies to an invasion-of-privacy claim); Kiner v. Reliance Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1990) (applying a two-year statute of limitations to a slander claim).

We affirm the judgment of the District Court.