Aaron Storm appeals after he pleaded guilty to child-pornography and attempted-kidnapping charges, under a written *524 plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, and the District Court 1 imposed the agreed-upon sentence. At his sentencing hearing, Storm moved pro se to withdraw his guilty plea, and the court denied his motion. On appeal, Storm’s counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), challenging the denial of Storm’s motion to withdraw his plea. Storm has not filed a pro se brief.

We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable and applicable to the issue raised in this appeal, based in part on Storm’s own statements at his change-of-plea hearing. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997, 124 S.Ct. 501, 157 L.Ed.2d 398 (2003); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that a defendant’s representations made during a plea hearing are presumed to be true).

We have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion, and we dismiss this appeal.