James Ivy directly appeals the sentence the district court 1 imposed after he pled guilty to a firearm charge, pursuant to a plea agreement that contained an appeal waiver. His counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), acknowledging the appeal waiver, and relaying Ivy’s argument that Ivy is entitled to be resentenced because he received ineffective assistance of counsel.'

We conclude that the appeal waiver is valid and enforceable. In particular, we note that Ivy’s own statements at the change-of-plea hearing indicated that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and appeal waiver. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s representations during plea-taking carry strong presumption of verity).

As to the ineffective-assistance claim, we decline to consider it on direct appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that ineffective-assistance claims are usually best litigated in collateral proceedings where the record can be properly developed).

Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the appeal waiver. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.