United States v. Geoffrey Six

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

United States v. Geoffrey Six

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 21-2214 ___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Geoffrey Seldon Six

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central ____________

Submitted: January 3, 2022 Filed: January 6, 2022 [Unpublished] ____________

Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

Geoffrey Six pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 846, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In an Anders brief, Six’s counsel suggests that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). A pro se supplemental brief raises several other issues.

We conclude that Six’s sentence is substantively reasonable. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence under “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that a within-Guidelines-range sentence is presumptively reasonable). The record establishes that the district court 1 sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 923– 24 (8th Cir. 2006).

As for the issues raised in Six’s pro se supplemental brief, the district court did not plainly err when it declined to apply a mitigating-role reduction or give him relief under the so-called safety valve. See United States v. Kirlin, 859 F.3d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard of review). And Six’s ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim, to the extent he tries to raise it here, will have to await “collateral” review. United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826–27 (8th Cir. 2006); see also App. Br. at 1 (claiming that “[his] lawyer failed to properly represent [him] and . . . bring to light [certain] issues”).

Finally, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court, grant counsel permission to withdraw, and deny the pending pro se motion as moot. ______________________________

1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. -2-

Reference

Status
Unpublished