United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 21-3824 ___________________________

Krishonn Cooney

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

State of Arkansas; Taylor Doobie, Officer, Morrilton Police Department; Nathan Watkins, Officer, Morrilton Police Department; Willcut, Detective

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central ____________

Submitted: January 26, 2022 Filed: February 1, 2022 [Unpublished] ____________

Before KELLY, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

Arkansas inmate Krishonn Cooney appeals the district court’s preservice dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, in which he claimed his rights were violated by illegal searches. The district court found that Cooney’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), based on state court convictions which arose from evidence discovered in the searches.

Initially, we grant Cooney leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484–85 (8th Cir. 1997). As to the merits, upon careful review, see Colbert v. City of Monticello, Ark., 775 F.3d 1006, 1007 (8th Cir. 2014) (reviewing de novo a dismissal of claim under Heck), we conclude Cooney’s claims were not Heck-barred, as his arguments that the searches lacked probable cause do not necessarily call into question the validity of his state court convictions, see Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (noting “a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction”). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings.1 ______________________________

1 We express no opinion as to whether any defendant or claim may be subject to dismissal for any other reason, including if it becomes clear that Cooney’s only alleged injury “encompass[es] the ‘injury’ of being convicted and imprisoned.” See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7; see also Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473, 476 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting benefit of having district court address issue in first instance).

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