United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 21-3433 ___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Artie Dee Dillard

Defendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas ____________

Submitted: April 11, 2022 Filed: August 8, 2022 [Unpublished] ____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

Artie Dee Dillard pled guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The district court1 calculated an

1 The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) range of 15 to 21 months of imprisonment for the marijuana offense and 60 months of imprisonment for the firearm offense. The sentences are statutorily required to be served consecutively. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (providing that the sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime shall be “in addition to the punishment for such . . . drug trafficking crime”). The district court sentenced Dillard to 60 months of imprisonment for the marijuana count (a 39-month upward variance) and 60 months for the firearm count, to be served consecutively.

On appeal, Dillard argues the district court procedurally erred in imposing the sentence, because it did not sufficiently explain the reasoning behind the large upward variance for the marijuana count. Dillard also argues the sentence is substantively unreasonable. Neither argument prevails.

“[W]e review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines range, [under] ‘a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 518 F.3d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 2008)). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) ‘fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight’; (2) ‘gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor’; or (3) ‘considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009)). “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Brown, 992 F.3d 665, 673 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464).

The district court adequately considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) while explaining its reasoning for varying upward. It recounted Dillard’s crime of conviction and criminal history, including fleeing from police repeatedly, invading people’s homes with a weapon, and “[j]ust terrorizing people.” The district court explained this consistently violent and criminal behavior warranted an upward -2- variance, which it also believed was necessary to protect the public and deter Dillard from future criminal activity. This was within the district court’s discretion. See United States v. Richart, 662 F.3d 1037, 1052 (8th Cir. 2011).

We therefore conclude the district court neither procedurally nor substantively erred when it sentenced Dillard. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. ______________________________

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