Samuel Trapp v. John Gunn
Samuel Trapp v. John Gunn
Opinion
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________
No. 21-3726 ___________________________
Samuel Edward Trapp
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v.
John Gunn; State of Missouri; John W. Grimm; Lauren McCubbin; Thomas Vincent Bender; Mischa Epps; Julia Lasater; Christa Barber Moss; Jason Arthur Paulsmeyer; Sam Phillips; Paul C. Wilson; John Doe I, Members of the Missouri Bar Client Security Fund Committee; John Doe, II, Members of the Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees ____________
Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City ____________
Submitted: September 8, 2022 Filed: September 13, 2022 [Unpublished] ____________
Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. ____________
PER CURIAM. Samuel Trapp, a Missouri attorney whose license to practice law was suspended indefinitely in 2014, appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of his civil complaint against various individuals and entities associated with the Missouri Bar and Missouri’s licensing and disciplinary proceedings. Upon careful review, we affirm. See Skit Int’l, Ltd. v. DAC Techs. of Ark., Inc., 487 F.3d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 2007) (reviewing de novo dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine). We agree with the district court that Trapp’s claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that while lower federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges to state bar rules, they do not have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings); see also Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d 351, 356 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding the district court could not review disbarred attorney’s claims and grant relief without effectively reviewing and reversing the decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court related to his disbarment; because federal claims were inextricably intertwined with the state case, the court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman). We also conclude the district court did not err in dismissing Trapp’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); King v. Crestwood, 899 F.3d 643, 651 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard of review). Finally, we deny as moot the motion to dismiss filed by the State of Missouri and Chief Justice Wilson.
Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. ______________________________
1 The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 2 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
-2-
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished