United States v. Roberto Esquivias-Sandoval

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

United States v. Roberto Esquivias-Sandoval

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 24-1759 ___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Roberto Esquivias-Sandoval, also known as Luis Manuel Zamora Briseno, also known as Pedro Esquivias

Defendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern ____________

Submitted: December 18, 2024 Filed: December 23, 2024 [Unpublished] ____________

Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

After pleading guilty to illegally reentering the United States and conspiring to distribute controlled substances, Roberto Esquivias-Sandoval received a 158- month prison sentence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), (viii), (B)(vi), 846. An Anders brief suggests he should not have received a drug-premises enhancement or a lengthy sentence. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

We conclude otherwise. Evidence of drug sales at Esquivias-Sandoval’s home supported the finding that he “maintained a premises for the purposes of . . . distributing . . . controlled substance[s].” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12); see United States v. Armstrong, 60 F.4th 1151, 1169 (8th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Sykes, 854 F.3d 457, 459, 461 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that a handful of sales, plus circumstantial evidence like cash and packaging materials, was enough). Then, based on that finding, the district court 1 calculated the advisory range, selected a sentence, and explained its reasoning. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion). In doing so, it sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Noriega, 35 F.4th 643, 652 (8th Cir. 2022) (stating that “reversal is not appropriate simply because the district court did not weigh the § 3553(a) factors as [the defendant] preferred”).

We have also independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel permission to withdraw. ______________________________

1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. -2-

Reference

Status
Unpublished