United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 23-2835
                        ___________________________

                           United States of America

                                     Plaintiff - Appellee

                                       v.

                               Michael R. Hoeft

                                  Defendant - Appellant
                                ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the District of South Dakota - Southern
                                  ____________

                           Submitted: March 1, 2024
                             Filed: June 7, 2024
                               ____________

Before ERICKSON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

KOBES, Circuit Judge.

     A jury found Michael Hoeft guilty of possessing with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, 

(a)(1), and possessing a firearm as a prohibited
person, 

(g)(1), (g)(9), 924(a)(2). Hoeft appeals, challenging four
of the district court’s 1 rulings. We affirm.

                                           I.

       Around 9:45 one morning, three police officers responded to a call from the
manager of a gated storage facility. The manager had reported that someone who
“didn’t belong there” was “passed out behind the wheel” of a small white pickup.
Inside the gate, the officers saw a truck matching that description halfway down an
alley of storage units and noticed that its lights were on. They parked their squad
cars in a way that arguably blocked the alley, and they approached on foot.

       As the officers got closer, they saw Hoeft asleep in the driver’s seat with a key
in the ignition and a loaded crossbow on the passenger seat. One officer reached
inside the open driver’s-side window to make sure the truck was off, waking Hoeft
up in the process. In what started as a friendly exchange, Hoeft told her that he was
doing “better than average” and had just stopped there to “take some crap out of the
back.” But things quickly escalated.

       The officer told Hoeft to step out of the truck because the crossbow made her
nervous, but Hoeft refused, insisting that he had a storage unit there. So the officers
tased him, dragged him out, and arrested him. Searching Hoeft and his truck, the
officers found 4 baggies containing a total of about 70 grams of methamphetamine,
some syringes, a scale, a .22 caliber handgun, and—of course—the crossbow.

                                          II.

      Hoeft claims that the district court erred by denying his motions to suppress
the evidence discovered after his arrest, to dismiss the gun charge from the


      1
        The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.
                                    -2-
indictment, for judgment of acquittal on the drug charge, and to admit an out-of-
court statement he made to a chemical dependency counselor.

                                         A.

       We start with Hoeft’s argument that the district court should have suppressed
the evidence found by the police because it was the fruit of an unconstitutional
seizure. We review the district court’s denial of Hoeft’s motion to suppress de novo
and any underlying factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Banks,

 (8th Cir. 2009). The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all
searches and seizures; it only forbids unreasonable ones. Terry v. Ohio, 

 (1968). And a brief investigatory stop is reasonable if supported by “reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a person is committing or is about to commit a crime.”
United States v. Stokes, 

, 1107 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

       Hoeft says that the officers seized him by blocking the alley. Assuming he’s
right, the seizure was reasonable. When the officers arrived, they knew about the
manager’s report that a trespasser was passed out behind the wheel of a small white
truck, and they saw a truck that matched the description and appeared to be running.
Based on these articulable facts, the officers had reasonable suspicion that Hoeft was
trespassing and had “physical control of a[] vehicle while” intoxicated. See S.D.
Codified Laws § 32–23–1; see also State v. Kitchens, 

, 651–52 (S.D.
1993) (per curiam) (upholding § 32–23–1 conviction where defendant was sleeping
behind the wheel in a parking lot).

       Even so, Hoeft argues that the stop became unreasonable when the officer
ordered him out of the truck because his statements dispelled any earlier suspicion.
We disagree. The officers were not required to believe Hoeft’s claim that he rented
a unit there, and his self-assessment that he was doing better than average did not
show that he was sober. Cf. United States v. Mosley, 

 (8th Cir.
2017) (rejecting argument that “any reasonable suspicion based on the witness’s tip
dissipated” simply because “initial investigation did not bolster [officer’s] original
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suspicion”). Plus, the officers had a valid concern for their safety because Hoeft had
a loaded crossbow at the ready. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable to
order Hoeft out of the truck as they finished a brief investigation. See Schoettle v.
Jefferson Cnty., 

 (8th Cir. 2015) (reasonable to order driver out
when officer had reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated); United States
v. Long, 

, 800–01 (8th Cir. 2003) (reasonable to order driver out when
facts “create[d] a plausible concern for officer safety”).

                                         B.

       Next, Hoeft argues that the court should have dismissed the gun charge from
the indictment because § 922(g)(1) and (g)(9) are facially unconstitutional—a claim
we review de novo. See United States v. Veasley, 

 (8th Cir. 2024).

       We have already held that § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from
possessing guns, is constitutional. See United States v. Jackson, 

(8th Cir. 2023) (holding § 922(g)(1) constitutional “as applied to Jackson and other
convicted felons” and foreclosing “felony-by-felony litigation regarding [its]
constitutionality” (citing N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 

(2022))). And we pass no judgment on § 922(g)(9), which prohibits people
convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing guns. Any error in
refusing to dismiss that portion of the charge was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury stated in a special verdict form that it found Hoeft guilty under both
§ 922(g)(1) and (g)(9), so it would have convicted Hoeft on the gun charge even if
§ 922(g)(9) was removed from the indictment. Cf. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 

 (2008) (per curiam) (holding that an instruction on an invalid alternative theory
of guilt can be harmless); United States v. Marin, 

, 1054 n.2 (8th Cir.
2022) (declining to consider arguments about § 922(g)(3)’s constitutionality after
finding evidence sufficient to sustain conviction under § 922(g)(8)).




                                         -4-
                                         C.

       Turning to the drug charge, Hoeft argues that the district court should have
granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence
that he intended to distribute the meth he possessed. He says that he possessed only
a user amount—at least for a heavy user like him.

       We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Matheny,

 (8th Cir. 2022). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and reverse only if “no reasonable jury could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Blair, 

 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). A jury may infer intent to
distribute “solely from possession of a large quantity” of a drug. United States v.
Franklin, 

 (8th Cir. 1984). But a user quantity, on its own, is not
enough. United States v. Lopez, 

 (8th Cir. 1994). A small amount
must be bolstered by other evidence that indicates drug dealing, like packaging “in
a manner consistent with distribution,” other drug distribution paraphernalia, large
amounts of cash, and weapons. Franklin, 

.

       Even assuming that 70 grams of meth could be a user quantity for a heavy
addict, we find that a reasonable jury could infer intent to distribute here. The
Government did not rely on quantity alone. An investigator testified that the scale,
the gun, and the packaging of the meth indicated street-level distribution. While the
jury also heard testimony that mere users often use scales to make sure dealers do
not short them and that Hoeft used the gun for hunting, it was free to reject these
alternative explanations. United States v. Ellis, 

 (8th Cir. 2016).

                                         D.

       We end with Hoeft’s claim that the district court should have allowed a
chemical dependency counselor to testify about what he said to her during a post-
arrest evaluation. Hoeft told her that he was using two “eight-balls” (totaling about
                                         -5-
seven grams) a day when he was arrested. This out-of-court statement would have
bolstered Hoeft’s in-court testimony to the same effect and refuted the Government’s
evidence that even a “chronic binge use[r]” uses only about five grams a day. Hoeft
argued that his statement was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements
made for medical diagnosis or treatment. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). But the district
court excluded it, reasoning that Hoeft had an incentive to fudge the numbers so he
would be charged with mere possession. See United States v. Renville, 

 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that “declarant’s motive in making the statement
must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment”).

       We ordinarily review “evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, but where
constitutional rights are implicated, ‘we consider the matter de novo.’” United States
v. White, 

 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also United States
v. Holmes, 

 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, which includes
the right to present testimony of witnesses that is material and favorable to their
defense and complies with the rules of evidence.” (cleaned up) (citation omitted)).
We will reverse only if the error “affected substantial rights or had more than a slight
influence on the verdict.” White, 557 F.3d at 857–58 (citation omitted).

       We do not decide whether the district court erred because we conclude that its
decision to exclude the statement was harmless. Hoeft took the stand and discussed
his daily drug use, so his out-of-court statement would not have introduced anything
new into evidence. At most, it would have padded his in-court testimony. Under
these circumstances, excluding the statement had no more than a slight influence on
the verdict. See United States v. Walker, 

, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 2019);
cf. United States v. Gettel, 

 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A trial error is
harmless if other evidence to the same effect was properly before the jury.” (cleaned
up) (citation omitted)).




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                            III.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
               ______________________________




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