United States v. Jermaine Jones

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

United States v. Jermaine Jones

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 24-2605 ___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jermaine D. Jones

Defendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City ____________

Submitted: September 19, 2025 Filed: October 8, 2025 [Unpublished] ____________

Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

After Jermaine Jones violated conditions of his supervised release, the district court1 revoked his supervision and sentenced him to a total of five years’ imprisonment, with no supervision to follow. This five-year sentence included a one- year consecutive sentence for Jones’s conviction for being a drug user in possession

1 The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). On appeal, Jones argues that the district court plainly erred 2 by imposing the one-year revocation sentence for his drug-user-in-possession conviction because he had previously served the initial statutory maximum sentence for that crime. Specifically, he contends that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit a district court from imposing a supervised release sentence above the statutory maximum for the underlying crime based on judge- made factual findings.

Circuit precedent forecloses Jones’s argument. See, e.g., United States v. Childs, 17 F.4th 790, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2021) (rejecting the defendant’s argument “that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum because the number of years he served was greater than the sum of the maximum term of imprisonment plus the maximum term of supervised release”; concluding that “the law of the offense” governs “[t]he maximum term of imprisonment”; and determining that “[s]upervised release is distinct from the prison term, and the amount of time to be served is determined separately”); United States v. Eagle Chasing, 965 F.3d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Until the Supreme Court invalidates [18 U.S.C.] § 3583(e)(3), we must follow our precedent and hold that the revocation of Eagle Chasing’s release did not violate his constitutional rights.”); United States v. Poe, 471 F. App’x 556, 556 (8th Cir. 2012) (unpublished per curiam) (“[S]upervised release may be imposed in addition to the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction . . . .”).

Jones acknowledges our circuit precedent but nonetheless argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), casts that precedent into doubt. We disagree. As the government correctly points out, “Erlinger did not address supervised release or the statutory maximum sentence that

2 Jones concedes that plain-error review applies because he failed to object before the district court. See Appellant’s Br. 7. “To obtain relief, [Jones] must show an error that is plain, affects his substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Mull, No. 24-2822, 2025 WL 2364592, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025) (unpublished per curiam). -2- can be imposed upon revocation. Instead, it ‘concerns the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.’” Appellee’s Br. 14 (quoting Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 825). Erlinger held that “the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury” to determine “beyond a reasonable doubt” whether “a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions” for purposes of the ACCA’s “lengthy mandatory prison terms.” 602 U.S. at 825. Because Erlinger does not address supervised release or the maximum sentence that a court can impose upon revocation of supervised release, we follow our circuit precedent. See Eagle Chasing, 965 F.3d at 651.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, in sentencing Jones to five years’ imprisonment. We affirm the district court’s judgment. ______________________________

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Reference

Status
Unpublished