(after stating the case as above). We must accept as correct and legal the finding of the court as to the amount of fees and mileage earned by the plaintiff, and the fact that it was by including the mileage the United States made the amounts sued for by the defendant in error to be in excess of the maximum compensation allowed by law. That this could be legally done seems to be the basis of the answer of the United States. In the case of Smith v. U. S., 26 Ct. CL 568, the contrary was held, and this decision *153lias been affirmed by llie supreme court of the United States. 158 U. S. 346, 15 Sup. Ct. 846. The latter court, speaking by Mr. Justice Brewer, said:

“While ail allowance for travel fees or mileage is, by section 823, Rev. St., included in the fee bill, we think it was not intended as compensation to a district attorney for services performed, but rather as a. disbursement for expenses, or presumed to be incurred in traveling from his residence to the place of holding court, or to the office of the judge or commissioner.”

It follows from this and from the effect necessary to be given to the finding of the circuit court, that there was no error in allowing the fees earned in the years 1890, 1891, and 1893, to wit, the items of $566.38, $750, and $641.20. This leaves for consideration only the fees allowed in special cases, to wit, The Pilot against United States, Dunsmuir against Bradshaw, United States against Gee Lee and Ross against Eells.

The services in the first three cases were performed at the request of the attorney general, in ibis court, and the compensation for them fixed by him. Part of the sum allowed in The Pilot against United States was paid, and the balance was retained because it was in excess of the maximum of personal compensation allowed by law. The same reason was given for the non-payment of the fee in United states against Gee Lee. Why the fees in the other two cases were retained does not appear. However, it is now broadly contended that the fees were illegal, that the services for which they are claimed the plaintiff was compelled to render at the request or direction of the attorney general, and that there is no authority of law for paying him any fee in excess of the fees allowed by law under section 824, Rev. St., and the statutes giving the district of Washington double fees. It is further urged that the findings show the fees allowed are in excess of any fees Umt could have been allowed by sections 824 and 29!) of the Revised statutes. This contention depends upon the answer to the question whether the provisions of the statute relating to district attorneys are to be confined to services rendered within their districts, or are to be construed as governing services rendered elsewhere, making these as much official as the others. Section 767 of the Revised Statutes provides that:

"There shall be appointed in each district, except in the Middle district of Alabama and the Northern district of Georgia and the Western district of Month Carolina, a person learned in the law to aót as attorney of the United States in such district. « * *”

By this section the sphere of his duty is his district. He is attorney for the United States within that, and section 771, which defines his duties, repeats the limitation. It is as follows:

“Sec. 771. It shall be the duty of every district attorney to prosecute in his district all delinquents for crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States are concerned, and, unless otherwise Instructed by the secretary of the treasury, to appear in behalf of the defendants in all suits or proceedings pending in his district against collectors, or other officers of the revenue, for any act done by them, or for the recovery of any money exacted by or paid to such officers, and by them paid into the treasury.”

*154Sections 823 and 824 only provided the fees and compensation, stating and enumerating the instances of service, and fixing a fee for each of them. It is not necessary to quote these sections at length, as, manifestly, they are only incidental to our inquiries. It may be observed, however, that the mileage allowed by section 824 is confined to traveling to United States courts in this district. Besides these sections, section 299 must be considered. It is as follows:

“Sec. 299. All accounts of the United States district attorneys for services rendered in cases instituted in the courts of the United States, or of any state, when the United States is interested, but is not a party of record, or in cases instituted against the officers of the United States, or their deputies, or duly appointed agents, for acts committed or omitted or suffered by them in the lawful discharge of their duties, shall be audited and allowed as in other cases, assimilating the fees, as near as may be, to those provided by law for similar-services in cases in which the United States is a party.”

Special stress is put upon this section by counsel for the United States as fixing the compensation for services rendered by a district attorney outside of his district. But the section is silent as to the locality of the service. Besides, it is but a direction to the officers of the treasury of the manner of auditing an account of certain official services,, and, while it gives a measure of their compensation, it does no more. It certainly does not enlarge the powers of a district attorney, or his official scope. It would have strange and confusing consequences if it did. Under it, any district attorney could claim or be compelled to take authority in every district in the country besides the one to which he was appointed. It seems to us, therefore, that all these provisions apply to sendees of a district attorney rendered within his district, and for services outside of it they prescribe no rule.

The United States also claims that the plaintiff is precluded from recovering, to the extent awarded by the circuit court, by section 3 of the act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat. 109), which provides that:

“No civil officer of the government shall hereafter receive any compensation or perquisites, directly or indirectly, from the treasury or property of the United States, beyond his salary or compensation allowed by law: Provided, that this shall not be construed to prevent the employment and payment by the department of justice of district attorneys as now allowed by law for the performance of services not covered by their salaries c- fees.”

This statute, like the, sections of the Revised Statutes already considered, must be confined to “compensation or perquisites” claimed officially. The words “compensation or perquisites” import this. The provision was, no doubt, intended to give exactness, and confine the remuneration of officers to the fees and compensation expressly allowed by the various and appropriate statutes.

The services in the cases of Ross against Eells were rendered within plaintiff’s district. The cases were commenced in a state court, and removed to the federal court. The best view which can be taken of the services is that they are governed by section 299, Rev. St. Even if this be so, defendant in error urges that, notwithstanding, the compensation claimed must be allowed, because (1) the record is silent as to whether the attorney general and the *155accounting officers assimilated the fees under section 824, and that these officers must be favored with the presumption that they knew the law and properly performed their official duty; (2) that the only services similar to those for which Winston (defendant in error) seeks a recovery are rendered by attorneys especially retained on behalf of the government in particular cases, and that for such services the attorney general is authorized to fix the amount of compensation, and that in this manner, at least, the fees of defendant in error were correctly assimilated by virtue of section 299. We do not think either position is well taken. We think the record is very clear that the compensation allowed by the attorney general, to wit, $400, was not allowed in assimilation of any fee provided for by section 824, or that the test of cases under section 299 is what would be allowed to private counsel employed by the attorney general. It follows, therefore, it was error to allow this item, and the judgment must be modified accordingly, and it is so ordered. In all else, it is affirmed.

I dissent. The items of $366.38, $750, and $641.20, allowed the plaintiff by the court below, and for which he was given judgment, were for fees legally earned by him in the years 1890, 1891, and 1893, respectively, and duly allowed by the accounting officers, but: withheld by the treasury department upon the ground that they were all in excess of $6,000 per annum, the maximum compensation allowed by law to district attorneys. To make up that maximum, however, the officers of the treasury included mileage fees allowed to the plaintiff, exceeding in amount the aggregate of the three items above stated. In U. S. v. Smith, 158 U. S. 346, 15 Sup. Ct. 846, it was held that mileage fees constitute no part of the compensation allowed district attorneys for service's, from which it necessarily results that the plaintiff was properly awarded, by the court below, judgment for the sums, respectively, of $566.38, $750, and $641.20.

Rut the amounts awarded the plaintiff in the court below in the cases entitled The Pilot against United Btat.es, Dunsnmir against .Bradshaw, United States against Q-ee Lee, and Ross against Eells, have no such basis to rest upon. In the first three of these cases, the sendees for which the plaintiff was allowed compensation were rendered outside of his district, and in this court of appeals at the city of Ban Francisco. The services were rendered by the direction of the attorney general, which officer fixed the compensation to be allowed the plaintiff for his services in the case of The Pilot against United States at the sum of $400, in the case of Dunsmuir against Bradshaw at $310, and in the case; of United States against Gee -Lee at §250. In Ross y. Eells the plaintiff’s services were rendered within the district of Washington, of which district the plaintiff was. United States attorney from the 19th day of February, 1890, to May 30, 1893. In March, 1893, two suits were brought in the state court of Washington by one Frank Ross and certain Indians against Edwin Eells and other officers of the United States, in which suits the plaintiff, at the request of the United *156States, appeared, and caused them to be removed into the United States court for the district of Washington. Part of the plaintiff’s services in those suits were rendered while he held the position of attorney for the government, and a part after his term of office had expired. For the services rendered by him while in office, the attorney general made an allowance to the plaintiff of §400, which has not been paid, and for services rendered by him after his term of office expired, the attorney general made an allowance of §600, for which congress subsequently made an appropriation, and which the plaintiff has received.

The questions, therefore, remaining for decision, 'are whether the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment he recovered in the court below for the respective sums allowed him by the attorney general for his services rendered while in office in his own district in the cases of Ross against Eells and in this court of appeals, in ¡San Francisco, in the cases entitled, respectively, The Pilot against United States, Dunsmuir against Bradshaw, and United States against Gee Lee. And they depend for. solution upon the provisions of the statute; for it is clear that, unless there is statutory authority for the claims of the plaintiff, the court is without power to give judgment against the United States therefor. “Fees allowed to public officers,” said the court, in U. S. v. Shields, 153 U. S. 88, 91, 14 Sup. Ct. 735, “are matters of strict law, depending upon the very provisions of the statute. They are not open to equitable construction by tlie courts, nor to any discretionary action on the part of the officials.'’

Turning, now, to the provisions of the statute in respect, to the compensation allowed district attorneys, we find it provided, by sections 823 and 824 of the Revised Statutes, as follows:

“Sec. 823, Tlie following and no other compensation shall lie taxed and allowed to attorneys, solicitors and proctors in tlie courts of the United States, to district attorneys, * * * except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law. '* * *

“Sec. 824. * * * For examination by a district attorney before a judge or commissioner of persons charged with crime, 85.00 a day for tbe time necessarily employed. For each day of his necessary attendance in a court of the United States on the business of the United States, when the court is held at the place of his abode, and for his attendance when the court is held elsewhere, $5.00 for each day of the term. For traveling from the place of his abode to the place of holding any court of the United States, in his district, or to the place of any examination before a judge or commissioner of a person charged with crime, ten cents a mile for going, and ten cents a mile for returning. When an indictment for crime is tried before a jury and a conviction is had, ihe district attorney may be allowed, in addition to attorney's foes heroin provided, a counsel fee in proportion to the importance and difficulty of the cause, not exceeding $30.00.”

Sections 825, 826, and 827 of the Revised Statutes, relating, as they do, to fees allowed the district attorney in revenue cases and in suits on official bonds, have no application to tlie present case, and need not, therefore, be referred to. By section 771 of the Revised Statutes it is provided that:

“It shall be tbe duty of every district attorney to prosecute in his district all delinquents for crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States are concerned, and, unless otherwise instructed by the secretary of the treasury, to appear *157in behalf of tlie defendants in all suits or proceedings pending in his district against collectors or other officers of the revenue, for any act done by them, or for the recovery of any money exacted by or paid to such officers, and by them paid into the treasury.”

By the section last mentioned it is made the duty of a district attorney, among other things, to prosecute, in his district, “all civil actions in which the United Stab's are concerned.” This requirement is confined to his district, and his compensation, provided for by sections 823 and 824. supra, is for services rendered wiihin his own district. None of these provisions of law relate to service's rendered by district attorneys outside of their districts. By section 3 of the act .passed by congress June 20, 1874 (18 Stat. 109)), it. is provided that:

“No civil officer of the government shall hereafter receive any compensation or perquisites directly or indirectly from the treasury or properly of the United States beyond his salary or compensation allowed by law: Provided, that this shall not be construed to prevent the employment and payment by the department of justice of district attorneys, as now allowed by law, for tile performance of services not covered by their salaries or fees.”

This proviso, Hit' supremo court held, in U. S. v. Smith, supra, “author mes the department of justice to employ and pay district attorneys ‘its now allowed by law’ for the performance of services not covert'd by their salaries or fees,” but that it cannot he ’presumed “that congress intended thereby to throw the door open to district attorneys to charge what they deemed to be, or what proved to be, a reasonable sum for the performance of such services, as the proviso especially limits them to the cases in which they had heretofore been allowed to be employed and paid by the department, for services not covered by their salaries or fees.” The proviso, the court proceeded to say, “was probably designed to be read in conned ion with Rev. St. § 299, providing that ‘all accounts of (he United Urates district attorneys for services rendered in cases instituted in the courts of the United States, * * * where the United States is interested, but is not a party of record, * * * shall be audited and allowed as in other cases, assimilating the fees, as near as may be to those provided by law for similar services in cases in which the United States is a ty.’ ”

It perfectly deal', from the findings of the court below, that the amounts allowed by the attorney general to the plain till, upon which the court below proceeded in giving him judgment for services rendered in his capacity of district attorney in his district in the cases entitled Boss against: Bells, and in this court in the cases entitled, respectively, The Pilot against United States, Ihnmmuir against Bradshaw, and United States against Gee Lee, were not assimilated to the fees and compensation provided for by section 824 of the Revised Bí a hiles; referred to in the proviso to section 3 of the act: of June 20, 3873, as held by the supreme court in U. S. v. Smith, supra. The fact that such assimilated fees often may, and in this case will, be very inadequate compensation, cannot justify this court in sustaining a judgment against the United Btates not justified by the law as it exists.

Whether a district attorney can be compelled to render services for the government outside of his district by the direction of the attorney *158general is a question we are not called upon to decide. That the attorney general is at liberty to call upon the district attorney in each district to defend, as a part of his official duty, the interest of the government in any suit there' pending in which it is interested, seems to be held in the case of U. S. v. Smith. It is also there held that the provision, found in section 363 of the Revised Statutes, authorizing the attorney general, whenever the public interest requires it, to employ and retain, in the name of the United States, such attorneys and counselors at law as he may think necessary to assist the district attorneys in the discharge of their duties, and to stipulate with such assistant attorneys and counselors the amount of compensation, does not contemplate that the district attorney himself shall be so employed.

It results from what has been said that the allowances made by the court below to the plaintiff for services rendered in the cases entitled, respectively, Ross against Eells, The Pilot against United States, Dunsmuir against Bradshaw, and United States against dee Lee, were without authority of law, and that the judgment to that extent is erroneous. I therefore think the cause should be remanded to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment in accordance with the views above expressed.