(after stating the facts as above). It is assigned as error that the District Court adjudged the appellant a bankrupt. It is contended that the failure of the appellant to release and discharge the preference of the execution creditor was not an act of bankruptcy on his part, the debt not being his debt, nor the merchandise levied on his property, but that of a firm with which he had severed his connection months prior thereto, and it is argued that at *923the time of the alleged act of bankruptcy the firm had long ceased to exist, and that no act can be committed by a nonexisting entity. The vice of this argument is that it assumes that an insolvent partnership at the time of its dissolution ceases to be an entity. The rule is well settled that, where assets or debts of a partnership remain after dissolution, the partnership is considered as subsisting as to its creditors until its property is subjected to the satisfaction of their claims. In re Crockett et al., 2 Ben. 514, Fed. Cas. No. 3,402; In re Foster, 3 Ben. 380, Fed. Cas. No. 4,962; In re Noonan, 3 Biss. 491, Fed. Cas. No. 10,292; In re Stowers et al., 1 Lowell, 528, Fed. Cas. No. 13,516; In re Hirsch et al. (D. C.) 97 Fed. 571. The bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418], in recognition of this rule, provides in section 5a that a partnership during the continuance of the partnership business or after its dissolution, and before the final settlement thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt, and section 5c provides that the court of bankruptcy which has jurisdiction of one of the partners may have jurisdiction of all the partners and of the administration of the partnership and individual property. See In re L. Stein & Co., 127 Fed. 547, 62 C. C. A. 272.

It is true that an individual member of a firm cannot be adjudged a bankrupt for an act of bankruptcy not committed by him or in which he did not participate (In re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976, 39 C. C. A. 368); but that is not the case here presented. The act of bankruptcy in this case was committed by all the members of the firm. It was an act of omission, the failure to discharge the levy of the execution, a duty which rested as much upon the appellant as upon any member of the firm. Notwithstanding the dissolution of the copartnership, it remained, as it was before, the appellant’s duty to see that the property of the copartnership was devoted to the payment of the partnership debts, as to which he had not been released.

The adjudication is affirmed.