Eugene Marvin Davis v. B. J. Rhay, Superintendent of the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, Washington
Cases that cite this one
4 later published cases cite this decision.
- Lawrence J. Saros v. G. v. Richardson, Warden (9th Cir. 1971)
- Henry Dennis Stamps v. United States (9th Cir. 1971)
- Weston v. State Ex Rel. Eyman (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968)
- Jean Ruth Rawson, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas Roy Rawson, Deceased v. Calmar Steamship Corporation, a Corporation (9th Cir. 1962)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
Davis appeals from the denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus to be released from a sentence of imprisonment for second degree assault (assault with a deadly weapon). After pleading not guilty to this charge Davis, represented by counsel, changed his plea in open court to guilty.
One of his contentions is that the Washington statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional because as interpreted by the court it deprives him of equal protection of the law. This court decided this question adversely to his contention in the recent case of Jones v. Rhay, 254 F.2d 393.
Davis further contends that he was induced to plead guilty because his attorney wrongfully advised him to do so on the representation that he could obtain from the prosecuting atorney a recommendation to the Washington Parole Board that Dayis be sentenced for no more than two years on the count of the information charging him with second degree assault and a withdrawal of the other count of the information. This proposal was accepted by the prosecuting attorney and carried out, though in the course of their discussion the prosecutor told Davis’ attorney that the Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Parole would pay no attention to any recommendation made by him. The trial judge, pursuant to the state law, imposed the maximum sentence of 10 years for the offense but recommended to the Board that they set the sentence for two years.
The court and the two lawyers were apparently unaware that under the Washington law the minimum sentence for this offense was 7% years and the Board so fixed the sentence. For the *619 reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge Driver (Davis v. Rhay, 156 F.Supp. 114), who heard the ease below, we affirm his decision that the sentence should not be set aside.
Davis in his brief here also contends that his plea of guilty is void because coerced by confinement in an overcrowded and unhealthy jail cell and by a starvation diet. No such allegation is contained in his application for the writ nor are such facts stated in Davis’ testimony before Judge Driver.
Judgment is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.