U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1959

Lyndol L. Young and Mildred W. Young v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Decided June 24, 1959 · Stephens, Maris, Barnes

268 F.2d 245; 4 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5056; 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 3597 (Federal Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

Francis J. McEntee, Lyndol L. Young, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners., Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Davis W. Morton, Jr., Lee A. Jackson, Robert N. Anderson, Arthur I. Gould, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Cases that cite this one

9 later published cases cite this decision.

Reginald G. Hearn and Mary L. Hearn, Husband and Wife v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (9th Cir. 1962)
Howe A. Stidger and Betty M. Stidger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (9th Cir. 1965)
Polish American Club, Inc. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1974)
Mance T. Spillers and Mary J. Spillers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (5th Cir. 1969)
Wolf v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (9th Cir. 1966)
Wolf v. Commissioner (9th Cir. 1966)
Fred J. Tabery and Leone M. Tabery, on Review v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on Review (9th Cir. 1965)
Los Angeles Extension Company v. United States of America, Security First National Bank v. United States (1st Cir. 1963)
Clement L. Hirsch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (9th Cir. 1963)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

It is an admitted fact in this appeal that Mr. Young, petitioner herein, was an active practicing lawyer at the California bar with a well-paying clientele, and that unlike the usual method of practice of law, he spent a comparatively small amount of time in a law office, using instead his home and his clubs as his main working places. In the income return with his wife he claimed certain deductions based upon his own allocation of home rental charges, club dues, and business travel expenses. No time books were kept, and it is not claimed by the taxpayer that the claimed deductions were arrived at by him through any means other than his own estimate of the proportion of his expenses which should reasonably be charged to the residence and to clubs and to travel as business expenses.

The Commissioner allocated substantially lesser portions of these expenditures to business expense. The Tax Court held with the Commissioner and Mr. Young filed his petition for review.

As in other cases coming to us * on appeal, we are not accorded the right to retry the issues de novo on the record and we must affirm unless the Tax Court decision was arrived at through plain error. We are asked to ascribe error to the Tax Court and to find that the claimed allocations were not unreasonable. The decision of the Tax Court is entitled to the same consideration as the decision of a district court in a case tried without a jury. To reverse it we must find that it is clearly erroneous, in other words, that the taxpayer’s evidence so clearly showed the Commissioner to *246 be wrong that the decision in the Commissioner’s favor was palpably in error. We do not view the evidence so favorable to taxpayer. Upon the record it cannot be held that taxpayer has sustained his burden of showing error.

Affirmed.

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