These are six consolidated appeals from orders of the district court requiring the production of corporate records specified in summonses issued by a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602.1

Appellants contend that enforcement of the summonses would offend the Fourth Amendment because they were issued solely to determine if a criminal violation had occurred. In Howfield, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1969), we stated that “summonses to examine taxpayer’s records, obtained pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602, may be used even where their purpose is allegedly to uncover crime, when no criminal case is actually pending against the taxpayer.” See United States v. Ahmanson, 415 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206, 208-209 (9th Cir. 1966); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-773 (9th Cir. 1956).

Appellants argue that the court below erred in rejecting their contention *1071that the summonses were oppressive and too broad in scope. The district court has considerable discretion in determining these matters, Dunn v. Ross, 356 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1966); In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1962), and the limits of that discretion were not exceeded here. Section 7602 requires that the records be “relevant or material” to the inquiry being made, but those terms have a broader connotation in this context than in the context of trial, United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1967); and although the records demanded appear to be voluminous, the Internal Revenue Service offered to inspect them at their place of storage. United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967).

Appellants offer nothing specific to support their assertion that they were “severely handicapped” by the trial court’s orders omitting the usual pretrial hearing and limiting discovery. We think the court acted within the discretion conferred upon it by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a) (3). See United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969).

Finally, certain appellants assert that the Regional Commissioner was required by 26 U.S.C. § 7605(b) 2 to make an independent investigation of the need for a reinspection of their books and records, and that he could not simply rely upon an investigation of need and recommendation for reinspection by the special agents, as appellants assert he did in this case. But as the Supreme Court said in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55, 85 S.Ct. 248, 254, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964), “Congress recognized a need for a curb on the investigatory powers of low-echelon revenue agents, and considered that it met this need simply and fully by requiring such agents to clear any repetitious examination with a superior.”

Affirmed.