Margie J. Threlkeld v. Stanley v. Tucker, (Two Cases)

OPINION

Margie Threlkeld, formerly Margie Tucker, 1 brought this diversity action upon a judgment for damages rendered by the California Superior Court against Stanley Tucker, a resident of Connecticut, in a state case, Tucker v. Tucker (Threlkeld). The United States District Court granted Threlkeld summary judgment, and Tucker, has filed these appeals, contending, inter alia, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction in an action upon a California judgment against a nonresident who had no *1103 contacts with California after suffering tEé~state iudgméñtT

The state-court judgment was entered upon Threlkeld’s counterclaims for malicious prosecution in one of the numerous actions brought by Tucker against Threlkeld in the California state courts. The bringing of six of these actions by Tucker was found to be a species of malicious prosecution for which damages, were assessed..

California’s long-arm statute, section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, states that:

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”

The jurisdiction of the California courts is therefore coextensive with the outer limits of due process under the state and federal constitutions, as those limits have been defined by the United .States Supreme Court. 2

Tucker moved to California in 1956 and remained there until 1961, when he moved to Connecticut. After leaving California, however, Tucker maintained an active interest in California. He visited the state several times a year, and filed more than 30 actions or proceed-, ings in the California courts. Between 1965 and 1967 Tucker filed several actions against Threlkeld in the California state courts.

In 1968, Threlkeld, tiring of the aetivities of Tier litigious former husband, counterclaimed, in - one of Tucker’s actions, for malicious prosecution. Tjucker did not defend, and the judgment which ü~íhe Fatojwct_xrf^tHIs"icSse was entered, of 1970. Fourteen months later, having received nothing in payment of the judgment, Threlkeld filed this action in federal court.

Since 1969, Tucker has not been physically present in California. When Threlkeld filed this action, she caused Tucker to be served with process in conformity with ^ California’s out-of-state-serviee procedure. Tucker has neither appeared nor voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The questign therefore is whether Tucker’s activities in - California were sufficient to furnish a ju-, rjsdictional basis for this action under the “minimum contacts” doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

In Tucker v. Tucker (Threlkeld), the state court had jurisdiction . over Tucker because, having instituted the action, he had submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction not only as to his own cause of action but also as to any counterclaim filed against him. Witkin, 1 Cal.Proc.2d, Jurisdiction, § 98. See also Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 58 S.Ct. 454, 82 L.Ed. 649 (1938); United States of Mexico v. Rask, 118 Cal.App. 21, 4 P.2d 981 (1931). Moreover, because his deliberate and repeated utilization of the California courts amounted to‘ “purposefully [availing himself] of "the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,” .Tucker became subject to|future_|ong-arm jurisdiction un the courts of California in an action arising out of such conduct. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). These same contacts would satisfy personal" jurisdiction if such a case were brought in -federal court, for Federal Rules of Civil *1104 Procedure 4(e) and 4(d)(7) instruct the fedmjr’courts to utilize the ípng-arm , st^tute^of .the. state within which the federal district court is located.

It is argued, however, that the present-action is not one arising directly from Tucker’s " liability-producing conduct. in California (repeated litigation), but-rather js, one arising out of a California , judgment. Superficially, this action is indistinguishable from any other action by a creditor whose claim has been reduced to judgment. It can be argued, then, that because this Action is not an action for malicious prosecution, but /merely, an action upon a judgment, Tncker’s. original contacts Caljfornia. while sufficignt to support the iudgment, are insufficient to^support jimsdiction in an action upon that judgment.

Inasmuch as the federal courts are not appendages’of the state courts, a„ federal court cannot enforce a state-court judgment without first independently establishing its own jurisdiction oyer the" subject matter and parties. See United States v. Potter, 19 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Fairbank Realty Corp., 50 F.Supp. 373 (E.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d on other grounds, 142 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1944). Here di: versity. jurisdiction provides the basiss for subject-matter jurisdiction, while the Tjucker-initiated state lawsuit (resulting, ,in, the. judgment sued upon in this aer /ion), viewed in the context of the other California contacts discussed throughout this opinion, provides the basis for per- , sonal jurisdiction. We emphasize that this action is not an attempt to use a federal court or federal process to enforce a state judgment, nor is it a routine action by a creditor seeking to use a federal court to obtain a judgment upon the creditor’s local judgment against a non-resident defendant. The claim here sue¿jrpon_is.-Qnly-one .step removed from a diversity action upon a tort committed by the_ nonresident, defendant in California, and it is closely. relatedto an elaborate course of forum-related activities carried on by the defendant.

When the “minimum contacts” doctrine is the sole Jbasjs for jurisdiction, the claim sued upon must arise out, of or be. connected, with the defendant’s forum-related activities. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal.2d 893, 80 Cal.Rptr. 113, 118, 458 P.2d 57, 62 (1969). The^claim (judgment) here sued upon was connected^ with and arose out of Tucker’s repeated"‘vexation of"h!s former wife in the courts of California,.

Where, as here, the action upon the judgment is brought withiiTa reasonable time after the judgment was'entered (in this case, fourteen months) "and where the conduct underlying ‘"the™ judgment clearly evidenced a pattern jf ' continued, deliberate contact with Calb_ fornia, there is nothing unreasonable or contrary to “traditional notions of fair" play and substantial justice” (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316) in subjecting the nonresident to the — jurisdiction -of a federal district ’ court in California. Cf. Marra v. Shea, 321 F.Supp. 1140 (N.D.Cal. 1971).

It is worth emphasizing the limits of our holding in this case. We do not hold that a valid state-court judgment by itself is sufficient basis for out-of-state service-upon a nonresident, defendant any time an action is brought upon that judgment in a federal court sitting in the state in-which the judgment was'entered. There must be a history of relevant contacts between the nonresident defendant and the state, The contacts must be related/to theJ state-court judgment, and must notjhave, been weakened by the passage of time. For "example, in this casVwe" have relleci primarily upon the fact that the defendant himself commenced the very action in which the judgment now sued upon was rendered. Further, that litigation was but part of a Tucker-initiated pattern of conscious and intentional utilization of the courts of the forum state. On these facts, there is no occasion to guard against the overreaching of a for< eign debtor by a local creditor.

*1105 Tucker’s other claims are either frivolous or barred by collateral estoppel. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.