ORDER

In our opinion filed December 4, 1989, cited at 890 F.2d 1082, we affirmed the sentence given by the district court, holding that a conviction under Washington’s second degree burglary statute could not serve as a basis for sentence enhancement. The district judge had relied on prior Ninth Circuit authority in United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Cunningham, 878 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1989).

The government petitioned for rehearing, suggesting that further action be withheld pending the decision by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States. Our order of March 15, 1990 deferred action on the government’s petition. Thereafter the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Taylor v. United States, — U.S. ——, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).

Taylor held that, for the purposes of enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), burglary includes any unlawful entry in “a building or structure, with the intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 2158 (emphasis added). The Washington statute defines burglary broadly to include entry into places other than buildings. Wash.Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(5). All of the prior burglary convictions relied upon by the government here involved entry into buildings. 1 Given that, it appears that Harkey’s prior burglary convictions should have *139 been considered for the purpose of sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Cunningham, 911 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1990).

Our opinion of December 4, 1989 is withdrawn. The government’s petition for rehearing is granted. The cause is remanded to the district court for resentencing.