Vergara v. Immigration Naturalization & Services
Vergara v. Immigration Naturalization & Services
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM
Ronaldo Sotto Vergara, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions for review of the BIA’s decision dismissing his applications for asylum and withholding of deportation. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a), as amended by § 309(c)(4)(A) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996), and we deny the petition. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we do not recount it here except as is necessary to explain our decision.
Vergara’s asylum claim fails because the government marshaled substantial evidence showing that Vergara could live safely in Manila, if not in his hometown of Cavite City. According to a report submitted by the State Department, the NPA’s
Because Vergara could live safely in Manila upon his return to the Philippines, he is ineligible for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)(l)(i)(B), (b)(2)(h).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
. "NPA” stands for New People's Army, which is the militant wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. We assume for the purposes of this disposition that the NPA committed the acts alleged by Vergara.
. Given Vergara’s marketable skills as a computer operator, and the fact that he grew up on Luzon, we also conclude that it is reasonable to expect Vergara to live in Manila.
. Vergara’s ability to live safely in Manila would not necessarily defeat his application were he to seek asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii). However, because Vergara has never argued for relief under this narrow exception, we decline to consider it. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that, as a general rule, we review only issues that are "argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”).
. That the BIA incorporated the Immigration Judge’s findings and conclusions in reaching its decision is unimportant. See Alaelua v. INS, 45 F.3d 1379, 1382 (holding that the BIA may adopt the Immigration Judge’s decision).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.