Silveira v. Lockyer
Opinion of the Court
Order; Dissent by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge KOZINSKI; Dissent by Judge KLEINFELD; Dissent by Judge GOULD.
ORDER
A majority of the panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc.
The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc. An active judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonre-cused active judges in favor of en banc reconsideration. FED. R. APP. P. 35.
The petition for rehearing en banc is denied.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:
I agree with the panel’s decision to uphold California’s Assault Weapons Control Act. But I part from the panel’s Second Amendment analysis. The right to keep and bear arms is in no way absolute; it is subject to reasonable restrictions such as those embedded in the statute the California legislature enacted. However, the panel misses the mark by interpreting the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as a collective right, rather than as an individual right. Because the panel’s decision abrogates a constitutional right, this case should have been reheard en banc.
Dissenting Opinion
GOULD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc:
The error of Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), is repeated once again, thus I respectfully dissent from denial of rehearing en banc for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1192-98 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., specially concurring). As I there explained, restricting the Second Amendment to a “collective rights” view and ignoring the individual right of the people to keep and bear arms is inconsistent with the Second Amendment’s language, structure, and purposes, and weakens our Nation against recurrent internal and external threats that may undermine individual liberty. See also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc:
Judges know very well how to read the Constitution broadly when they are sympathetic to the right being asserted. We have held, without much ado, that “speech, or ... the press” also means the Internet, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997), and that “persons, houses, papers, and effects” also means public telephone booths, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). When a particular right comports especially well with our notions of good social policy, we build magnificent legal edifices on elliptical constitutional phrases — or even the white spaces between lines of constitutional text. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). But, as the panel amply demonstrates, when we’re none too keen on a particular constitutional guarantee, we can be equally ingenious in burying language that is incontrovertibly there.
It is wrong to use some constitutional provisions as springboards for major social change while treating others like senile relatives to be cooped up in a nursing home until they quit annoying us. As guardians of the Constitution, we must be
The able judges of the panel majority are usually very sympathetic to individual rights, but they have succumbed to the temptation to pick and choose. Had they brought the same generous approach to the Second Amendment that they routinely bring to the First, Fourth and selected portions of the Fifth, they would have had no trouble finding an individual right to bear arms. Indeed, to conclude otherwise, they had to ignore binding precedent. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939), did not hold that the defendants lacked standing to raise a Second Amendment defense, even though the government argued the collective rights theory in its brief. See Kleinfeld Dissent at 586-587; see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller’s Tale: A Reply to David Yassky, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 113, 117-18 (2002). The Supreme Court reached the Second Amendment claim and rejected it on the merits after finding no evidence that Miller’s weapon — a sawed-off shotgun — was reasonably susceptible to militia use. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816. We are bound not only by the outcome of Miller but also by its rationale. If Miller’s claim was dead on arrival because it was raised by a person rather than a state, why would the Court have bothered discussing whether a sawed-off shotgun was suitable for militia use? The panel majority not only ignores Miller’s test; it renders most of the opinion wholly superfluous. As an inferior court, we may not tell the Supreme Court it was out to lunch when it last visited a constitutional provision.
The majority falls prey to the delusion— popular in some circles — that ordinary people are too careless and stupid to own guns, and we would be far better off leaving all weapons in the hands of professionals on the government payroll. But the simple truth — born of experience — is that tyranny thrives best where government need not fear the wrath of an armed people. Our own sorry history bears this out: Disarmament was the tool of choice for subjugating both slaves and free blacks in the South. In Florida, patrols searched blacks’ homes for weapons, confiscated those found and punished their owners without judicial process. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Ameri-canist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L.J. 309, 338 (1991). In the North, by contrast, blacks exercised their right to bear arms to defend against racial mob violence. Id. at 341-42. As Chief Justice Taney well appreciated, the institution of slavery required a class of people who lacked the means to resist. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857) (finding black citizenship unthinkable because it would give blacks the right to “keep and carry arms wherever they went”). A revolt by Nat Turner and a few dozen other armed blacks could be put down without much difficulty; one by four million armed blacks would have meant big trouble.
All too many of the other great tragedies of history — Stalin’s atrocities, the killing fields of Cambodia, the Holocaust, to name but a few — were perpetrated by armed troops against unarmed popula
My excellent colleagues have forgotten these bitter lessons of history. The prospect of tyranny may not grab the headlines the way vivid stories of gun crime routinely do. But few saw the Third Reich coming until it was too late. The Second Amendment is a doomsday provision, one designed for those exceptionally rare circumstances where all other rights have failed — where the government refuses to stand for reelection and silences those who protest; where courts have lost the courage to oppose, or can find no one to enforce their decrees. However improbable these contingencies may seem today, facing them unprepared is a mistake a free people get to make only once.
Fortunately, the Framers were wise enough to entrench the right of the people to keep and bear arms within our constitutional structure. The purpose and importance of that right was still fresh in their minds, and they spelled it out clearly so it would not be forgotten. Despite the panel’s mighty struggle to erase these words, they remain, and the people themselves can read what they say plainly enough:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
The sheer ponderousness of the panel’s opinion — the mountain of verbiage it must deploy to explain away these fourteen short words of constitutional text — refutes its thesis far more convincingly than anything I might say. The panel’s labored effort to smother the Second Amendment by sheer body weight has all the grace of a sumo wrestler trying to kill a rattlesnake by sitting on it — and is just as likely to succeed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc:
I respectfully dissent from our order denying rehearing en banc. In so doing, I am expressing agreement with my colleague Judge Gould’s special concurrence in Nordyke v. King,
The panel opinion holds that the Second Amendment “imposes no limitation on California’s [or any other state’s] ability to enact legislation regulating or prohibiting the possession or use of firearms”
Our circuit law regarding the Second Amendment squarely conflicts with that of the Fifth Circuit.
The panel decision purports to undertake historical analysis. Historical context has its uses in understanding the context and purposes of any law, constitutional or legislative,
Much of the panel decision purports to be an attempt to figure out what the word “militia” means in the Second Amendment. But the panel’s failure to cite the contemporaneous implementing
The panel opinion swims against a rising tide of legal scholarship to the contrary, relying heavily on a single law review article that claims “keep and bear” means the same thing as “bear,” which itself means only to carry arms as part of a military unit.
About twenty percent of the American population, those who live in the Ninth Circuit, have lost one of the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights. And, the methodology used to take away the right threatens the rest of the Constitution. The most extraordinary step taken by the panel opinion is to read the frequently used Constitutional phrase, “the people,” as conferring rights only upon collectives, not individuals. There is no logical boundary to this misreading, so it threatens all the rights the Constitution guarantees to “the people,” including those having nothing to do with guns. I cannot imagine the judges on the panel similarly repealing the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the right of “the people” to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,
I.
The Constitution with its amendments is the supreme law of this land, not historical artifact, so we must read it, determine what it means, and follow it, regardless of our policy preferences. The Second Amendment to the Constitution provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
The panel’s strongest argument (but not strong enough) is that the word “bear” in the phrase “bear Arms” “customarily relates to a military function,” so that when not acting in a military capacity, “the people” have no right to bear Arms.
Of course one can cherry-pick dictionary definitions, just as one can carefully select from legislative and other history. The panel opinion cites a law review article citing the Oxford English Dictionary, and asserts that the OED “defines ‘to bear arms’ as ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.’ ”
The word “keep” poses a much more difficult problem for those who, like the panel, favor judicial repeal of the Second Amendment. While “bear” often has a military meaning, “keep” does not. For centuries, the primary meaning of “keep” has been “to retain possession of.”
The panel claims that “[t]he reason why that term was included in the amendment is not clear.”
Colonial statutes, as well as those more recent, used “keep” and “bear” to mean two different things. These statutory usages show that before, during, and after Congress adopted the Second Amendment, “keep” and “bear” were not used in a “unitary” sense, nor was “keep” limited to militia service. For instance, seamen and others exempt from militia service were sometimes nevertheless required to “keep” arms.
II.
The most important phrase for determining the scope of the operative words of the Second Amendment (and the most troublesome to the panel) is “the right of the people.” The operative words of the amendment syntactically protect the right of “the people,” not the “militia,” to keep and bear arms. Despite the panel’s extensive discussion of “keep,” “bear,” and the preamble, it simply skips over “the right of the people” and attempts no direct analysis of the phrase. Marbury v. Madison held that “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”
The “collective rights” interpretation of the Second Amendment, that it confers a “right” only on state governments with respect to state militias, is a logical and verbal impossibility in light of the phrase “right of the people.” As our Constitution is written, governments have “powers” but no “rights.” People have both “rights” and “powers.” And the Bill of Rights carefully distinguishes between the powers of the states and the rights of the people, never speaking of rights of the people when it means powers of the states.
The Tenth Amendment expressly draws both distinctions, between powers and rights, and between powers of state gov
The Fifth Circuit conducts this same analysis in United States v. Emerson.
The panel’s holding that the right of “the people” with respect to weapons “was not adopted in order to afford rights to individuals”
The panel’s interpretation is inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.
In the usage of the Bill of Rights, a right of “the people” is precisely what the panel says it is not: a right of individuals that, like their right to peaceably assemble and to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the Constitution entitles them to assert against the government.
There is also a collective aspect to “the people,” but hardly the government — run collective contemplated by the panel. “We the People,” when we “ordain and establish this Constitution,”
As Blackstone describes the “natural right” of an Englishman to keep and bear arms, the arms are for personal defense as well as resistance to tyranny. The two are
III.
The Second Amendment begins with the clause “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State-”
Much of the panel opinion addresses the meaning of the term “militia,” yet the panel fails to acknowledge the controlling authorities that establish the meaning. The word “militia” is a term of art, and does not mean in the Constitution and laws of the United States what it means in some popular and journalistic usage — a group of ultra-right wing individuals who arm themselves as a paramilitary force. The panel defines militia as “the permanent state militia, not some amorphous body of the people as a whole.”
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Miller
The Second Amendment was ratified in 1791. The next year, Congress enacted the Militia Act,
In the appendix, I have reproduced the full text of this act of the Second Congress of the United States, and the text of section one appears in the footnote. It is worth noting a few additional aspects of the act. First, “each and every” “free able-bodied white male citizen” between 18 and 45 is in the militia. Second, each such person “shall” be enrolled by the commanding officer and notified of his enrollment, whether he wants to be enrolled or not.
An incidental benefit from reading this contemporaneous implementing statute is that it makes perfectly obvious what “well regulated” meant at the time the Second Amendment was adopted. The panel seems to imagine that a well regulated militia is a people disarmed until the government puts guns in their hands after summoning them to service. But the contemporaneous statute shows that a well regulated militia is just the opposite, a people who have armed themselves at least to minimal national standards, and whom the militia officers inspect to assure that they have not wandered in off the streets without guns.
The federal militia act promulgated immediately after the Second Amendment was ratified assured that no state could lighten the burden of its militia — eligible citizens, perhaps by requiring of them only a dozen rounds of ammunition instead of two dozen. And the militia officers had to check to make sure all the able-bodied white male citizens showed up when summoned, as a jury clerk does. Beyond that, they had to conduct inspections to make sure everyone had the firearms, bullets, bayonets, two spare flints, quarter pound of powder, ammunition pouch, and all the accessories the statute required of them.
The interpretation the panel gives to the phrase “well regulated” makes no more sense than the interpretation it gives to “militia.” The panel relies on a single law review article for the proposition that the purpose of a “well regulated Militia” is inconsistent with an individual right to. own weapons.
Were the modern federal statute to narrow the meaning of “militia” to something like the organized national guard that the panel envisions, then the statutory meaning of the term would differ from the meaning in the Second Amendment, and we would be bound, for Constitutional purposes, by the broader definition established by Miller. It would be as though Congress defined “press” for purposes of issuing press passes to a reserved section of the Capitol building to mean something narrower than “press” for purposes of the “freedom ... of the press” protected by the First Amendment. The new, narrower statutory meaning would not limit the Constitutional freedom.
We need not parse this problem, though, because Congress has broadened rather than narrowed the term. Today the United States Code still defines the term “militia.”
Thus, as used in law, the meaning of the word has not changed significantly, other
IV.
The next analytic task is to determine how the prefatory or purpose clause of the Second Amendment, “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,” bears on the meaning of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” The panel’s interpretation that the Second Amendment protects only the right of the states to arm their militias is syntactically impossible, because the language expressly provides that the right belongs to “the people” rather than the states or the militias. Treating the right the Second Amendment assigns to “the people” as a power of the militia is even less defensible than it would be to limit the Congressional power to grant copyrights only to those writings that actually do “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”
The historical context of the Second Amendment is a long struggle by the English citizenry to enable common people to possess firearms. When the Amendment was adopted, the drafters doubtless turned to provisions in many of the state constitutions as models.
The history that led to the drafting of the Second Amendment evolved for centuries in England, leading to its immediate predecessor in the English Declaration of Rights. A 1328 statute provided for forfeiture of arms and imprisonment if they
The English Bill of Rights, a century before ours, provided “That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law.”
The English Bill of Rights and the Constitution’s predecessor state constitutions based on it protected a private and individual right to bear arms both for self defense and for defense against oppression, as Blackstone explained. The Second Amendment was not novel, but rather codified and expanded upon long established principles. These principles protected individual, not collective, rights to keep and bear arms. And it was so understood. William Rawle’s A View of the Constitution, published in 1829, explained “The prohibition [in the Second Amendment] is general. No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretence by a state legislature. But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on both.”
Judge Thomas Cooley, in his The General Principles of Constitutional Law wrote “It may be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent. The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are officered and enrolled for service when called upon. But the law may make provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform military duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly omit to make any provision at all; and if the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty might be defeated alto
As Justice Thomas has written, “a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the ‘right to keep and bear arms’ is, as the Amendment’s text suggests, a personal right.”
V.
What we have, in the Second Amendment, is a prohibition against government infringement of an individual right to keep and bear arms, consistent with what had long been understood to be a natural right guaranteed by the English Bill of Rights to Englishmen. The militia clause expanded the protection from the English Bill of Rights to emphasize the importance of a check and balance on standing armies in addition to the traditional English right to possess arms for purposes of self-defense. Like any right, it is not absolute. Just as the right to freedom of speech is subject to limitations for defamation, threats, conspiracy, and all sorts of other traditional qualifications, so is the right to keep and bear arms. Indeed, the word “infringed” in the Second Amendment suggests that the right, such as it is, may not be “encroached upon,”
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Miller
Thus Miller cemented in, rather than reading out, the interpretation of the Second Amendment that I have followed. The Amendment reflected the Founders’ hostility to standing armies, and had as its purpose assuring the effectiveness of a civilian non-standing militia consisting of most of the able-bodied male population, who were expected and often required to own their own guns. The reason that the defendants (who did not appear on appeal)
What is striking about the reversal in Miller is the great care the court took to limit its holding. Miller did not adopt the
What private possession of arms does carry a “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia?” This is the question we must ask because this is the Second Amendment test Miller construes from the introductory clause of the Amendment. At the time the Amendment was drafted, when states were likely to have inadequate revenues to arm their militias, it was necessary that those who might be useful arm themselves with military type weapons. That is probably less relevant today, though times can always change. But the issue of furnishing arms for combat is not the only one involved in militia effectiveness. An effective militia requires not only that people have guns, but that they be able to shoot them with more danger to their adversaries than themselves. Standing next to a nineteen year old who for the first time has a loaded gun in his hands is like taking a fifteen or sixteen year old for his first driving lesson. And if no one knew how to shoot except designated shooters, a military supply unit of new recruits would be as helpless as if no one knew how to drive except designated drivers. Just as military mobility is enhanced by near — universal civilian knowledge of how to drive, likewise military effectiveness is promoted by widespread civilian shooting skills (and, we shall see, Congress has so decided and provided for civilian firearms training).
An effective militia undoubtedly requires that a considerable portion of the members enter it with some familiarity with gun safety and use. Beginning in 1916, Congress provided for the army to promote “practice in the use of rifled arms” by giving free weapons and ammunition to “youth-oriented organizations” and selling army surplus weapons to adults, in an army-assisted “Civilian Marksmanship Program.”
Though the stated justification and purpose of the Amendment relates to the militia, the language is carefully drafted to avoid abridging the traditional English Bill of Rights entitlement of individuals to possess arms for self defense. It would have, of course, been highly unlikely that the American Revolutionaries a few years later would have wanted to deprive Americans of rights they had always had as Englishmen. They protected this traditional right by attaching the “right ... to keep and bear Arms” to “the people,” rather than establishing it as a “power” of the states. The English right was retained, and expanded.
Like most serious discussions of the Second Amendment, this dissent focuses heavily on history. Though general history, like legislative history, cannot be used to supplant the words of the law, it informs us of what social problem the writers of the law intended to address.
VI.
Constitutional interpretation cannot properly be based on whatever policy judgments we might make about the desirability of an armed populace, or the relevance of the Amendment’s concern with citizen militias to modern times. Those who think the Second Amendment is a troublesome antique inappropriate to modern times can repeal it, as provided in Article V. That has been done before, as with legislative selection of Senators, and with Prohibition. There is a serious argument for its continued relevance, from those who think that the natural right to self defense, protected by the English Bill of Rights as well as the Second Amendment, is still important as a matter of policy. A police force in a free state cannot provide everyone with bodyguards. Indeed, while some think guns cause violent crime, others think that widespread possession of guns on balance reduces violent crime.
Neither can judges’ policy concerns affect our duty as a court. Congress and the states may enact reasonable restrictions to manage the ways in which the populace exercises its right to keep and bear arms, just as reasonable restrictions are imposed on our rights to free speech, free assembly, freedom from search and seizure, and all our other constitutional rights. What the Second Amendment prohibits is not reasonable regulation consistent with its purposes, but disarmament of the people. Where the Constitution establishes a right of the people, no organ of the government, including the courts, can legitimately take that right away from the people. All of pur rights, every one of them, may become impediments to the efficient functioning of our government and our society from time to time, but fortunately they are locked in by the Constitution against permanent loss because of temporary impediments. The courts should enforce our individual rights guar
APPENDIX
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. 319 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2003).
. 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
. Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).
. Mat 1056.
. Id. at 1092.
. Id. at 1087.
. Id. at 1086.
. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990), United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939).
. U.S. Const, art. V (describing amendment procedure).
. See Portland 76/Auto Truck Plaza v. Union Oil, 153 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The statute and not the legislative history tells us what solution Congress adopted for the problem, but the legislative history is useful to determine what the problem was.”).
. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519, 113 S.Ct. 1562, 123 L.Ed.2d 229 (1993) (Scalia, L, concurring) (paraphrasing Judge Harold Lev-enthal).
. Congress voted to send the Bill of Rights to the states in September 1789, and it was ratified by the states on December 15, 1791. The Militia Act was enacted in 1792.
. See Militia Act, 1 Stat. 271 (1792); 10 U.S.C. § 311.
. 307 U.S. 174, 179, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939).
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1074 (citing Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev 291, 294 (2000)).
. U.S. Const, amend. IV.
. U.S. Const, amend. I.
. U.S. Const, amend. II.
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1072-75.
. See 2 Oxford English Dictionary 20 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds.2d ed. 1989).
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1073 (citing David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History and Constitutional Change, 99 Mich. L.Rev. 588, 619 (2000) (internal citation omitted)).
. Oxford English Dictionary 634 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds.2d ed. 1989).
. The Oxford English Dictionary divides meanings broadly into "senses.” See id. at xxxviii-xxix.
. 2 Oxford English Dictionary 20 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds.2d ed. 1989).
. Id. at 21.
. Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, available at http://www.cbtministries.org/resources/ web-sterl828.htm (last visited April 21, 2003).
. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (permitting reasonable restrictions on exercise of right of free speech).
. See The American Heritage Dictionary 698 (2d ed. 1982).
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1074.
. Id. at 1074.
. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
. See Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L.Rev. 204 (1983).
. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
. U.S. Const, amend. X (emphasis added).
. 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
. Id. at 228.
. See Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189, 8 S.Ct. 737, 31 L.Ed. 650 (1888).
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1087.
.Id. at 1076.
. See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue of Oregon v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 342, 114 S.Ct. 843, 127 L.Ed.2d 165 (1994) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”) (quoting Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860, 106 S.Ct. 1600, 89 L.Ed.2d 855 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
. U.S. Const, amend. I.
. U.S. Const, amend. IV.
. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990).
. Id.
. The Supreme Court has not determined whether the Second Amendment has been "incorporated” so as to apply against the states. Some commentators suggest that a battle over incorporation stands between the Amendment and any right enforceable against state legislation. See, e.g., Gil Grantmore, The Phages of American Law, 36 U.C. Davis. L.Rev. 455, 474-75 (2003). The problem of exegesis posed by the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law is that somehow the prohibition against federal laws has to be extended to state laws. The Second Amendment says that "the right of the people ... shall not be infringed,” without limiting this protection of "the people’s” right to protection against the federal government, so there is no verbal barrier to incorporation as there was with the First Amendment. Since it is plain that the First and Fourth amendments, also protecting rights of "the people,” are incorporated against the states, it is hard to discern any sound reason why the right of "the people” in the Second Amendment would not be similarly incorporated.
. U.S. Const, pream.
. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 139 (Legal Classics Library 1983) (1765).
. Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L J. 309, 344 (1991).
. Mat 345.
. Id. at 345 n. 178.
. Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed 110-15 (2d ed. 1994). Chief Justice Taney, in contrast, had earlier led the Supreme Court to deny citizenship to blacks precisely because it was so unthinkable they should have the full rights of citizenship — ■ including the right "to keep and carry arms wherever they went.” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 417, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857).
. U.S. Const, amend. II.
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1072.
. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939).
. Id. at 179, 59 S.Ct. 816.
. Militia Act, 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
. That contemporaneous Congressional enactments should inform our interpretation of the Bill of Rights is well established. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788-92, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) (in discussing the constitutionality of opening legislative sessions with a prayer, "It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a Chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for submission to the States, they intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable.”).
. Id.
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1070.
. CHAP. XXXIII. — An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States.
(a)
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain or commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after the passing of this act. And it shall at all times hereafter be the duty of every such captain or commanding officer of a company to enroll every such citizen, as aforesaid, and also those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years, or being of the age of eighteen years and under the age of forty-five years (except as before excepted) shall come to reside within his bounds; and
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1087 (emphasis added).
. 1 Stat. 271 (1792) (emphasis added).
A musket is a shoulder gun, not necessarily rifled, named as guns used to be after a small bird of prey. A firelock is a flintlock, igniting the powder by flint and steel much as a Zippo ignites lighter fluid; a rifle is a shoulder gun with grooves in the barrel to make the bullet spin like a foot-ball as it flies. See 5 Oxford English Dictionary 950 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds.2d ed. 1989) (firelock); 10 Oxford English Dictionary 132 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds.2d ed. 1989) (musket); and see generally John Olson, The Book of the Rifle, 7-9 (1974); NRA Firearms Fact Book 33-35 (3d ed. 1989).
. 1 Stat. 271 (1792) (emphasis added).
. Id.
. The notion of regulation requiring rather than prohibiting civilians to carry guns is not so antique as this reference may be taken to imply. The previously silent Alaska statutes
. See Joyce Lee Malcom, To Keep and Bear Arms 139 (Harvard 1994).
. Id. at 144.
. Mat 145.
. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Second Amendment as a Window on the Framer’s Worldview, in Eugene Volokh, Robert J. Cot-trol, Sanford Levinson, L.A. Powe, Jr., & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Second Amendment as Teaching Tool in Constitutional Law Classes, 48 J. Legal Educ. 591, 598 (1998).
. 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1072 (citing Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 195, 234 (2000)).
. Finkelman, 76 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. at 234.
. 10 U.S.C. § 311. Militia: composition and classes
(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are—
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia
. U.S. Const, art. I.'
. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 793, 814 et seq. (1998).
. Id. at 794 et seq.
. Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (quoted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 209 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer, eds., Liberty Fund 1987)).
. Sir John Knight's Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B. 1686) (quoted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 209 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., Liberty Fund 1987)).
. Joyce Lee Malcom, To Keep and Bear Arms 113 (Harvard 1994).
. Id. at 115.
. 1 W. & M„ 2d sess., c, 2, Dec. 16, 1689 (quoted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 210 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., Liberty Fund 1987)).
. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).
. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (Scalia, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 136, 139 (Legal Classics Library 1983) (1765).
. Id. at 139.
. Id. at 125.
. Id. at 126.
. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States, 125-26 (2d. ed 1829) (quoted in 5 The Founders' Constitution 214 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., Liberty Fund 1987)).
.3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1890 (1833) (quoted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 214 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., Liberty Fund 1987)).
. Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America 281-82 (2d ed. 1891) (quoted in David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 1359, 1465 (1998)).
. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182 n. 3, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939).
. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n. 2, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing J. Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo American Right 162 (1994); S. Hal-brook, That Every Man Be Armed, The Evolution of a Constitutional Right (1984); Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 Duke L.J. 1236 (1994); Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193 (1992); Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L.J. 309 (1991); Levin-son, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 (1989); Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L.Rev. 204 (1983)).
. See, e.g., 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 902 n. 211 (3d. ed. 2000) (recognizing a "right (admittedly of uncertain scope) on the part of individuals to possess and use firearms in the defense of themselves and their homes 8.”) and Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 46-63 (1998) (adopting individual rights view).
. The American Heritage Dictionary 661 (2d ed. 1982).
. 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939).
. Id. at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816.
. Id. at 179, 59 S.Ct 816.
. Id.
. Sitveira, 312 F.3d at 1087.
. 307 U.S. at 179, 59 S.Ct. 816.
. Id. (quoting 1 Osgood, The American Colonies in the 17th Century).
. Id. at 180, 59 S.Ct. 816.
. Id. at 180-81, 59 S.Ct. 816.
. Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed 165 (2d ed. 1994).
. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816 (emphasis added).
. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 223 (5th Cir. 2001).
. 10 U.S.C. § 4308 (1995).
. 36 U.S.C. § 5501 (1996) (current version at 36 U.S.C. §§ 40701-02).
. 36 U.S.C. § 5502 (1996), recodified at 36 U.S.C. § 40722.
. 36 U.S.C. § 5502 (1996) recodified at 36 U.S.C. § 40724.
. See Portland 76/Auto Truck Plaza v. Union Oil, 153 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1998).
. See, e.g., John Lott, More Guns, Less Crime (1998).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Sean SILVEIRA Jack Safford Patrick Overstreet David K. Mehl Steven Focht, Sgt. David Blalock, Sgt. Marcus Davis Vance Boyce Keneth Dewald v. Bill LOCKYER, Attorney General, State of California Gray Davis, Governor, State of California
- Cited By
- 21 cases
- Status
- Published