Dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Although the majority’s disposition acknowledges that this case is governed by the BIA’s decision in Matter of Gutierrez, 19 I & N Dec. 562, 1988 WL 235445 (1988), the majority’s rationale strays far from that ruling. In Gutierrez, the BIA expressly cautioned that determination of whether to allow an alien in exclusion proceedings to withdraw her application for admission, should not be made by weighing the equities involved. Id. at 564; See also Sharma v. Reno, 902 F.Supp. 1130, 1139 (N.D.Cal. 1995). However, the majority disposition does exactly that by articulating “factors of admissibility which weigh heavily in Rojas-Castro’s favor.”

The proper focus on appeal is whether Rojas-Castro established that she possessed the intent and means to depart immediately and that her exclusion would not serve the interests of justice. See Gutierrez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 564-65; see also Sharma, 902 F.Supp. at 1139. Rojas-Castro made no such showing.

The majority accuses the IJ of declining to take testimony from Rojas-Castro as to her means and intent to depart. In fact, the record reflects that Rojas-Castro never intended to depart the United States. Rojas-Castro’s counsel specifically indicated to the court that Rojas-Castro’s intent in attempting to withdraw her application was to remain in the United States while she pursued her adjustment of status. (Administrative Record at 80-81, 98). Therefore, the rejected testimony was not as to Rojas-Castro’s intent to depart, but an attempt to explain the circumstances under which she was discovered attempting to reenter the United States without proper entry documents (Administrative Record at 107, 109). The proffered testimony was already a matter of record, having been explored thoroughly at Rojas-Castro’s criminal trial, where she was convicted of illegal entry (Administrative Record at 37, 77-78,107).

We must keep in mind the BIA’s caution “that it was never contemplated that the withdrawal of an application for admission would become a nonstatutory form of ‘relief from excludability which an applicant could apply for after excludability became apparent.” Gutierrez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 565. With that stricture in mind and in light of Rojas-Castro’s evidentiary failing, I find no abuse of discretion on the part of the IBA. See Sharma, 902 F.Supp. at 1140 (applying an abuse of discretion standard).

MEMORANDUM2

Roxana Rojas-Castro de Vargas (“Ro*813jas-Castro”) seeks review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an order of exclusion entered by the immigration judge (“IJ”).3 Rojas-Castro argues the IJ and BIA abused their discretion in denying her motion to withdraw her application for admission and denying her motion to continue the proceedings. She also argues she was denied a fundamentally fair hearing because the IJ denied her the opportunity to testify. We grant the petition for review and remand.

At the time of the proceedings before the IJ, neither statute not regulation directly provided for the withdrawal of an application for admission. Matter of Gutierrez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 562, 564, 1988 WL 235445.4 However, an immigration judge was permitted to allow the withdrawal if the alien showed that ‘justice may best be served’ by permitting withdrawal. Id. As held by the BIA, “[a]n immigration judge should not allow withdrawal unless an alien, in addition to demonstrating that he possesses both the intent and the means to depart immediately from the United States, establishes that factors directly relating to the issue of his admissibility indicate that granting withdrawal would be in the interest of justice (i.e., that justice would be ill served if an order of exclusion was entered).” Id. at 564-65. If withdrawal is requested after excludability becomes apparent, permission to withdraw should ordinarily only be granted with the concurrence of the Service. Id. at 565. The BIA has not defined the term “interest of justice” but has held that a balancing of the equities test is not an appropriate method to determine whether an alien should be permitted to withdraw an application for admission, and that instead “a narrower focus was intended” on the “factors directly relating to the issue of [the alien’s] admissibility.” Id. at 564.

Though Rojas-Castro conceded excludability, she was eligible for a waiver of excludability as the spouse of a United States citizen. See Ng v. I.N.S., 804 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1986). During the proceedings before the IJ, Rojas-Castro’s husband obtained U.S. citizenship and she filed an application to adjust her status and an application for waiver of excludability with the District Director. Even before Rojas-Castro’s husband became a U.S. citizen, Rojas-Castro was the beneficiary of an approved 1-130 Petition for Alien Relative filed on her behalf by her husband. This visa carried a priority date of November 14, 1991, but Rojas-Castro had not been able to apply for an immigrant visa or adjustment of status due to a backlog in Family 2A visa availability. The District Director, knowing Rojas-Castro had been convicted for attempting to enter the country without proper doeu*814mentation, granted her a work authorization permit while her application was under review. The IJ issued his decision in April 1996, though the District Director had interviewed Rojas Castro in conjunction with her applications one month earlier, in March 1996, and her applications were still pending.

These are all factors of admissibility which weigh heavily in Rojas-Castro’s favor.5 We note that despite these pending applications and the District Director’s actions, the Service repeatedly refused to administratively close the proceedings until the Director could issue a decision. Though the IJ stated that the facts and circumstances did not warrant withdrawal, he failed to articulate how, or even whether, he considered the factors relating to her admissibility.6 See Yepes-Prado v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In making a discretionary immigration decision, the agency must indicate how it weighed the factors involved and how it arrived at its conclusion.”). We conclude the IJ and the BIA abused their discretion by failing to give adequate consideration to the factors directly relating to Rojas-Castro’s admissibility. Those factors suggest the interests of justice would best be served by permitting the withdrawal even without the Service’s concurrence.

Additionally, the IJ failed to articulate whether or not Rojas-Castro met the fírst part of the application withdrawal criteria, i.e., whether she possessed “both the intent and the means to depart immediately from the United States.” Matter of Gutierrez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 564-65. The IJ declined to take testimony from Rojas-Castro. In his oral order, the IJ suggested Rojas-Castro’s pleadings reflected a desire to stay in the country, but acknowledged her counsel stated that she would depart. In fact, counsel stated Rojas-Castro would depart, but suggested she would not need to depart because she had a visa immediately available to her. The IJ did not reach a conclusion.

We therefore remand to the BIA to consider the factors of admissibility, both those articulated here and others that may be present, and to determine whether Rojas-Castro possessed both the intent and means to depart if the withdrawal is granted. The BIA should instruct the IJ to take any additional testimony necessary to adequately determine these questions.

We reject Rojas-Castro’s argument that the IJ erred in denying her request for a continuance at the final hearing on April 26, 1996. There is no evidence that Rojas-Castro requested a continuance at that hearing and, consequently, the IJ did not act upon it.

Petition for review is GRANTED and the matter REMANDED.