MEMORANDUM **

Francisco Olea-Pino appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to unlawful reentry by a deported, removed and/or excluded alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Olea-Pino asserts that the elements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) must be pled in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree and affirm.

The indictment here did not specifically charge that Olea-Pino committed an offense under § 1326(b)(2); it charged him under § 1326(a). As the Supreme Court has clearly held, that was proper because § 1326(b)(2) “is a penalty provision, which simply authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist. It does not define a separate crime. Consequently, neither the statute not the Constitution requires the Government to charge the factor that it mentions, an earlier conviction, in the indictment.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).

Olea-Pino argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), changes that. It does not. See United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2000). Nor does Ring v. *951Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), for it, too, excepts prior convictions from its strictures. Id. at 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Nor does Blakely v. Washington, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). See United States v. Quintana-Quintana, No. 03-50254, slip op. 13291, 13292 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2004). Finally, as we said in Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d at 414, we cannot “ignore controlling Supreme Court authority. Unless and until Almendarez-Torres is overruled by the Supreme Court, we must follow it.”

AFFIRMED.