Ostolaza-Ayala v. Gonzales
Ostolaza-Ayala v. Gonzales
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM
The immigration judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to terminate removal proceedings.
The regulation at issue, 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(f) (2001), provides that an “immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending application or petition for naturalization when the alien has established prima facie eligibility for naturalization.” The immigration judge did not err by determining that OstolazaAyala could not establish prima facie eligibility for naturalization because OstolazaAyala could not prove that he had been a person of good moral character for five years preceding the filing of his naturalization application.
Ostolaza-Ayala cannot prove he is a person of good moral character because he was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude.
Our holding in United States v. CoronaSanchez
Petition Denied.
^his disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
. The parties were ordered to file letter briefs on the issue of whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1429, no application for naturalization shall be considered if removal proceedings are pending, so petitioner’s application would not have been considered regardless of whether he had appeared at the time set for his interview.
. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427.
. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (emphasis added).
. United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.