MEMORANDUM *

Nicholas Blankenburg appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the United States, which was based on the Federal Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). For the exception to apply, the government must prove that (1) the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment or choice; and (2) the judgment or choice is the type the discretionary function exception was designed to shield, see Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988), that is, one based on “social, economic, or political policy.” See Summers v. United States, 905 F.2d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 1990). To determine whether the conduct involved an element of judgment or choice, courts inquire as to whether it was compelled by a federal statute, regulation, or policy. See, e.g., GATX/Airlog Co. v. United States, 286 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir . 2002).

Here, the relevant decision was discretionary, because there was no statute, regulation, or policy prescribing where the Forest Service placed signs. See also Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Because the [National Park Service] cannot apprise the public of every potential danger posed by every feature of the Park, a degree of judgment is required in order to determine which hazards require an explicit warning....”). The decision was also “susceptible to policy analysis,” per Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315, 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991), as the Forest Service is charged with weighing resource program needs, environmental and resource protection requirements, aesthetics, recreational goals, and budgetary concerns in addition to safety when making road maintenance or sign placement decisions.1 Ac*132cordingly, the discretionary function exception applied, and summary judgment was proper.

AFFIRMED.