Able Building Maintenance Co. v. Board of Trustees
Able Building Maintenance Co. v. Board of Trustees
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM
The appellants, the General Employees Trust Fund and its Board of Trustees (“Trust Fund”), appeal a decision of the district court, vacating an arbitration award in part and confirming the award in part. We reverse in part and remand.
In vacating the arbitration award in part, the district court reasoned correctly that the arbitration permitted by the Trust Indenture, in Section 7.13, does not apply to the part of the dispute that relates to losses incurred by the Trust Fund as a result of “improper contributions” made by the appellee, Able Building Maintenance Company (“Able”).
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
. The Trust Indenture also contains a general arbitration clause, Section 6.6, which provides that "[t]he trustees shall have the power to ... arbitrate ... any obligations, liability or claim involving this trust.” We need not consider the effect of that provision here.
. “A ‘self-executing’ arbitration clause is one which permits and provides for arbitration under rules therein incorporated” without the need for a prior court order. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc. v. Chronis, 72 Cal.App.3d 596, 601, 140 Cal.Rptr. 160 (1977); see also Nat’l Marble Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied Crafts med, 184 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1063, 229 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1986) (stating an agreement's "provisions are self-executing in ... that they set forth, without the necessity of resort to extrinsic material, the procedure to be followed ... in deciding contractual disputes”). Because the Trust Indenture sets forth the procedure for arbitrating claims relating to unpaid contributions, and a claim involving such contributions was referred to arbitration (albeit along with a claim on a different matter that was arbitrable but not covered by Section 7.13), the referral to arbitration was self-executing—no court order was required to establish the procedure by which arbitration of the claim for unpaid contributions was to be conducted before it could commence.
. Our conclusion that Able waived its objection to the arbitrator's exercise of jurisdiction over the part of the dispute relating to losses arising from improper contributions is unaffected by its argument that the arbitration should not have taken place because it had filed a complaint to enjoin it. As the district court correctly explained, Able never made the arbitrator aware that it had filed the complaint, which it could have done simply by appearing at the arbitration, of which it had proper notice, and giving the arbitrator a copy of the complaint. Instead, the appellee chose not to appear. In any event, Able offers no authority—and we are aware of none—for the proposition that the mere filing of a complaint precludes an arbitrator from proceeding with an arbitration. Accordingly, had Able made the arbitrator aware of the complaint and the arbitrator decided to nevertheless continue the arbitration, Able would have been required to participate in the proceedings and then raise its procedural objection before a court via a petition to vacate the award or by opposition to a petition to confirm. See Nat’l Marble Co., 184 Cal.App.3d at 1063-64, 229 Cal.Rptr. 653; see also A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 714 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that when a party seeks a court order enjoining an arbitration, the proper course of action is for it to participate in the arbitration until it actually obtains the injunction).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.