Spata v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.
Spata v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM
I. BACKGROUND
Cheryl Spata (“Spata”) appeals the district court’s order granting summary judg
Spata argues that the district court improperly applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting model for its FLSA analysis, ignored evidence, and erred by holding that tortious demotion was not actionable under Nevada law. As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedure of this case, we recite them only where necessary to explain our disposition.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant, Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005).
Spata argues that the district court erred by applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in its FLSA analysis.
Spata contends that she was demoted in retaliation for complaining about a potential FLSA violation. Smith’s warned Spa-ta, a manager, not to speak disparagingly to other employees, on pain of possible termination. Spata admits that she violated that warning. To counter Smith’s proffered, non-retaliatory reason for demoting her, Spata presented unavailing circumstantial evidence of retaliatory animus. Such evidence did not amount to the “specific and substantial” evidence of pretext required to avoid summary judgment. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998).
Spata is not entitled to immunity from discipline merely because she uncovered a possible FLSA violation. The evidence shows that Spata was demoted for her admitted misconduct rather than in retaliation for her complaints. Therefore, summary judgment was proper.
As to her public policy claim for tortious demotion, the district court properly ruled in favor of Smith’s. Spata remains employed by Smith’s, although demoted and presently on medical leave.
III. CONCLUSION
Spata has not provided specific and substantial evidence of pretext to counter Smith’s contention that it demoted her because she admittedly violated the warning not to talk negatively about Smith’s. Also, Spata has not demonstrated that her demotion amounts to an actionable public policy tort under Nevada law. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Smith’s as to Spata’s claims.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
. Under this framework, after the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). If the defendant provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is a mere pretext. Id.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.