Clemmons v. City of Long Beach
Clemmons v. City of Long Beach
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM
The County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department (col
Jerome Leslie Clemmons brought this action
(1) At the threshold, Clemmons argues that we do not have jurisdiction to hear the Sheriffs appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, or otherwise.
California accords immunity in this genre of cases. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 262.1 (hereafter § 262.1); Vallindras v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 42 Cal.2d 149, 154-55, 265 P.2d 907, 910-11 (1954) (stating there is immunity because “ ‘[a] result subjecting [the officer] to constant danger of liability would be an intolerable hardship to him, and [would] inevitably detract from the prompt and efficient performance of his public duty.’ ”); George v. County of San Luis Obispo, 78 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1054, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 595, 599 (2000) (holding if orders are “regular on their face” sheriff is immune.) And the immunity is an immunity from suit. See Gates v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 509, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 489, 505-06 (1995); cf. Richardson-Tunnell v. Sch. Ins. Program for Employees (SIPE), 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 176, 180 (2007) (immunity claims are jurisdictional).
(2) Just as § 262.1 supports our determination that we have jurisdiction, it supports the further determination that the Sheriff is entitled to immunity from Clemmons’ claim of false imprisonment. That is apparent from the face of the statute. Clemmons argues that the Sheriff had a duty to investigate facts brought to his attention after the Superior Court order issued. However, California law is to the contrary. As the California Supreme Court pointed out in Vallindras, it is the duty of the sheriff “to execute the orders of the court unless they are patently irregular and void”
(3) Clemmons finally asserts that because he founds his claim in part on California Constitution art. I, § 13, which precludes illegal seizures of persons,
In fine, the district court erred when it denied immunity to the Sheriff on Clemmons’ claims under California law.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
. As relevant here, the action is based upon California law and the Sheriff’s claim of immunity is also under California law.
. It is notable that at an earlier time, the Sheriff asked us for a writ of mandamus and we, through a motions panel, denied that request on the basis that an immediate direct appeal was available.
. Id.; cf. Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772, 776-777 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that where a sheriff is told to hold a particular person, he is not liable for doing so).
. The Sheriff also claims immunity under California Government Code § 821.6. Plainly, he is not entitled to it. See Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 158, 171 (2007); Sullivan, 12 Cal.3d at 722, 117 Cal.Rptr. at 248, 527 P.2d at 872; see also Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
. The California Constitutional provision is the functional equivalent of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
. See Jacob B., 40 Cal.4th at 961, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d at 487, 154 P.3d at 1011.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
For twenty-three days, the sheriff did not trouble himself to take Jerome Clemmons’s complaint seriously. The California Supreme Court has recognized that the sheriff must exercise reasonable diligence when carrying out a court order. See Vallindras v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 42 Cal.2d 149, 156, 265 P.2d 907 (1954). Even an “ordinarily intelligent and informed layman,” id. at 154, 265 P.2d 907, could see that Jerome Clemmons was being detained pursuant to an order naming
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.