MEMORANDUM **

The facts and procedural history of this case are familiar to the parties, and we do not repeat them here. Cabrera argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying as untimely his motion to reopen his application for cancellation of removal. Cabrera does not dispute that his motion to reopen was untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Instead, he argues that his delay should be excused because of ineffective assistance of an immigration consultant.1 His argument lacks merit.

Aliens have a statutory right to the counsel of their choice in “any removal proceedings before an immigration judge.” 8 U.S.C. § 1362. We have recognized that an alien’s Fifth Amendment due process rights in removal proceedings “include[ ] a right to competent representation from a retained attorney” and that “an alien is denied due process when his attorney provides ineffective assistance” at a removal proceeding. Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). We recently held, however, that the right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings does not guarantee the effective assistance of immigration consultants. See Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008). In Hernandez, the petitioners acknowledged that they knew their immigration consultant was not an attorney.2 Id. at 1015. We *585held “that reliance upon the advice of a non-attorney cannot form the basis of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding.” Id. at 1020. Hernandez forecloses the relief that Cabrera seeks.3

The petition for review is DENIED.