MEMORANDUM *

Joe Reyes, Jr., appeals both his conviction and sentence for failure to register or update his registration as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). See 18 U.S.C. § 2250; see also 42 U.S.C. § 16913. He challenges the indictment and the constitutionality of SORNA. He also challenges his sentence on the basis that the district court erred in determining that he was a Tier III sex offender under SORNA and the Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm. 1

(1) Reyes rests the challenge to his conviction on three major footings, each of which has been washed away by our recent decision in United States v. George, 579 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009). That is, his claim that he could not be convicted pursuant to SORNA because the State of Washington had not yet implemented the SORNA registration requirements falls. Id. at 965. So, too, does his vagueness claim. Id. at 965-66. Finally, his claim that SORNA violates the Commerce Clause 2 also collapses. Id. at 966-67. Concomitantly, the indictment, which was in a form that we have approved of, sufficiently informed him of the charges against him. See id. at 967; see also United States v. Awad, 551 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting out charging requirements for an indictment). Thus, his attempt to set aside his conviction fails.

(2) Reyes now asserts that the district court erred when it declared that he was a Tier III sex offender 3 and sentenced him accordingly. 4 However, his challenge was not raised at the district court. Rather, the district court’s determination was affirmatively accepted by Reyes and his counsel at the time of sentencing. When asked by the district court whether defense counsel agreed with the recalculated offense level, which resulted from the designation of Reyes’ Tier status as III rather than II, 5 counsel said that it appeared to be *805 accurate. The court thereafter twice offered counsel an opportunity to continue the sentencing hearing for the express purpose of “investigating” the issue, and counsel eschewed that offer. When the court explained to Reyes what that meant to his potential sentence range, and asked him if proceeding with sentencing under the recalculated offense level was acceptable, Reyes twice responded affirmatively. Thus, it is evident that Reyes was well aware of the right to challenge the tier assignment and waived the right to do so. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see also United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We will not consider the issue at this time. 6 Therefore, Reyes’ attack on his sentence also fails. 7

AFFIRMED, but REMANDED for correction of written judgment.