Daghlian v. Devry University

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SARO DAGHLIAN, on behalf of  himself and all others similarly

No. 08-55036 situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. v.  CV-06-00994- MMM DEVRY UNIVERSITY, INC.; DEVRY

ORDER INC.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted

July 9, 2009—Pasadena, California Filed July 31, 2009

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Order by Judge Wardlaw

COUNSEL

Gregory N. Karasik and J. Mark Moore, Spiro Moss Barness, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for the appellant.

Margaret M. Grignon and Felicia Y. Yu, Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles, California; Kim M. Watterson, Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the appellees.

9981 9982 DAGHLIAN v. DEVRY UNIVERSITY, INC. ORDER

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Saro Daghlian appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for class certification and grant of summary judgment in favor of DeVry University and its parent company, DeVry Inc. We lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and thus dismiss.

The California Private Postsecondary and Vocational Edu- cation Reform Act (“Act”), on which all of Daghlian’s claims are based, was repealed without a savings clause effective January 1, 2008. See Cal. Educ. Code § 94999 (West 2007). No subsequent legislation has been enacted to revive the Act.1 As Daghlian concedes, the repeal of the Act abates his Educa- tion Code claims. See Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist. v. Mann, 558 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1977) (in bank); see also Cal. Gov. Code § 9606 (West 2009). The appeal is therefore moot unless an exception to the abatement rule applies. See Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 493-94 (Ct. App. 2005); Younger v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 1014, 1018-19 (Cal. 1978) (in bank). We conclude that no exception applies. Daghlian did not state a claim for breach of contract, and his other claims were “wholly statutory,” Zipperer, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 494, as they were derivative of a violation of the Act. Because we cannot grant any effective relief, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1999).

DISMISSED.

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