concurring and dissenting:

I would affirm the district court’s order in its entirety. A decision by the Hawaiian Airlines System Board of Adjustment (the “Board”) is entitled to considerable deference, see Rossi v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 507 F.2d 404, 405 (9th Cir. 1974), including any plausible interpretation of the underlying collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). However, an award may be unenforceable when the arbitrator “strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispensed] his own brand of industrial justice.’ ” Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960)). Moreover, an arbitrator is bound to abide by the plain language of a collective bargaining agreement that limits his authority. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); Hawaii Teamsters and Allied Workers Union, Local 996 v. United Parcel Service, 241 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an award does not draw its essence from the CBA when the arbitrator ignores the plain language of the agreement).

*708In this matter, the CBA grants the Board authority to interpret the CBA. (“The Board shall have jurisdiction over disputes ... growing ... out of interpretation or application of any of the terms of the [CBA].”). However, the CBA explicitly states that “[b]efore a pilot is ... discharged, such pilot shall be notified in writing ... of the precise charge or charges against him or her.” On appeal, the Board may not consider a “matter” that has not yet been handled in accordance with the previous disciplinary procedure, i.e. a statement of charges and hearing.

Here the Board interpreted “matter” broadly to allow it to consider charges that had not been included in the Statement of Charges (“SOC”) filed against Konop. A review of the applicable portions of the CBA indicates that the Board’s interpretation of “matter” to mean anything besides specific instances of misconduct charged in the SOC is contrary to the clear purpose and intent of the parties as set forth in the CBA. Thus, the Board’s interpretation failed to “draw its essence” from the CBA. When read in conjunction with Section 16, which requires that the precise charge or charges be set forth in the SOC, the only “plausible” reading of the CBA requires that the Board rely only on factual instances of misconduct set forth in the SOC. Konop was entitled to rely on the SOC to determine what actions he had to defend.

The scheme set forth in the CBA is disrupted when Hawaiian Airlines (“HAL”) is allowed to advance new charges before the Board because this deprives an employee of fair standards of notice and renders him unprepared to defend new allegations not set forth in the SOC.1 Indeed, Konop’s attorney made this objection at the hearing. Moreover, the materials before this court suggest that neither HAL nor at least one of the three arbitrators were concerned with fairness.2 I would affirm the district court’s determination that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction when it based its decision on charges that had not been set forth in the SOC.

MEMORANDUM **

Appellant/Cross-Appellee Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (“Hawaiian”) appeals the district court’s order vacating an award by the Hawaiian Airlines System Board of Adjustment (the “Board”) affirming Hawaiian’s discharge of Appellee/Cross-Appel-lant Robert C. Konop (“Konop”). Konop cross-appeals the district court’s denial of his alternative grounds for vacating the award. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse that portion of the district court’s order vacating the Board’s award, affirm in all other respects, and remand for entry of judgment confirming the Board’s award.

I.

The district court correctly recognized that the required notice of “the precise charge or charges” to the employee limits the Board’s authority to decide disputes. The district court erred, however, by equating “charges” with “facts” or “evidence.” The CBA leaves open what constitutes or suffices as a charge. It does not define a charge, nor does it specify what information, or degree of factual detail, if any, is required. Cf. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 1154, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008) (“Even with the aid of regulations the meaning of charge [as used in the ADEA] remains unclear....”). While the charge must be “precise,” this might be merely the difference between a general allegation that the employee’s conduct violated the House Rules and an allegation that the employee violated a particular House Rule. In light of this ambiguity and lack of specific guidance from the CBA, the sufficiency and scope of the charges were properly left to *707the Board’s interpretation. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 679 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1982). Because the Board’s consideration of facts not specifically alleged in the Statement of Charges did not conflict with any express provision of the CBA, the district court should not have substituted its judgment for the Board’s. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 765, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 2183, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983) (“Because the authority of arbitrators is a subject of collective bargaining, just as is any other contractual provision, the scope of the arbitrator’s authority is itself a question of contract interpretation that the parties have delegated to the arbitrator.”). While an arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract in favor of “his own notions of industrial justice,” United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 371, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987), so long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing the contract, the reviewing court’s view of the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision— whether factually or-4-legally flawed or even “silly” — is irrelevant. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 1728, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (“[I]f an ‘arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,’ the fact that ‘a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.’”) (quoting E. Assoc’d Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62, 121 S.Ct. 462, 466, 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (2000)).

II.

In Konop’s cross-appeal, we affirm the issues presented below for the reasons cited by the district court. We decline to consider Konop’s claim of fraud and corruption as he failed to raise it before the district court. See FSLIC v. Butler, 904 F.2d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 1990) (“As a general rule, an appellate court will not consider arguments which were not first raised before the district court, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances.”).

Each party shall bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.