MEMORANDUM **

Terrence J. Peck appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 1 We affirm.

The district court’s decision was not based on an erroneous conclusion of law, or without rational basis in the record, as Peck maintains. The fact that Peck prevailed raises no presumption that the government’s position was not substantially justified. Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1988). Rather, for reasons the district court explained, the ALJ’s i*ejection of Dr. Soscia’s opinion and discounting of Peck’s subjective complaints, and the government’s defense of the ALJ’s decision, were based in the record even though this court ultimately disagreed with the ALJ’s assessment. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 569, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). The cases upon which Peck relies are distinguishable in that the ALJ here did not fail to do anything that he was supposed to do. Cf. Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008); Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court did not err in determining that the government’s position was substantially justified. Accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Peck’s motion for attorney’s fees.

AFFIRMED.