MEMORANDUM **

Without determining whether this claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas relief, we deny the claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Under AED-PA, we review the last reasoned decision by a state court, which in this case was the Washington Court of Appeals’s decision on direct appeal. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Washington Court of Appeals’s decision that Allen’s plea was voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Under Supreme Court precedent, a plea is voluntary so long as it is entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, and not induced by threats, misrepresentation, or improper promises. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Allen claims that his plea did not meet this standard because he was given an unreasonably short amount of time (a few hours) in which to consider the plea offer, his comments during his colloquy demonstrated that he felt under pressure, and his comments made after acceptance of the plea indicated that he regretted his choice. But no Supreme Court case holds that court-imposed time constraints render a plea involuntary per se, and under the circumstances of this case, the Washington Court of Appeals’s determination that Allen’s plea was voluntary notwithstanding the time constraints was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Moreover, the Washington Court of Appeals’s determination that Allen’s colloquy amply demonstrated his understanding of the direct consequences of the plea and that he entered into the plea without improper threats or misrepresentations was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See id. Accordingly, Allen’s petition for habeas relief is denied.

DENIED.