MEMORANDUM **

Charles James Chatman, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations in connection with the conditions of his confinement and the handling of his mail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003), and its grant of summary judgment, Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Chatman’s claims alleging inadequate food and denial of basic necessities because Chatman failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing this action. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Chatman’s First Amendment claims because Chatman failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correspondence at issue was legal mail. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (stating that legal mail must be “specially marked as originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if [it is] to receive special treatment”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Chatman’s claims against defendant Chen, the former Chief Deputy Inspector General for the Califor *600 nia Office of the Inspector General, because Chatman failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Chen was legally required to intervene after conducting investigations, at Chatman’s request, into the conditions of Chatman’s confinement. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (an official can be liable under section 1983 only “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation” of which plaintiff complains (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chatman’s requests for judicial notice where the news articles at issue did not contain adjudicative facts relevant to the parties’ dispute. See Fed. R.Evid. 201(b) (requiring judicially noticed facts to be “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review).

Chatman’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.