MEMORANDUM **

Eduardo Alfredo Vera-Morlas, a native and citizen of Ecuador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law, including whether a conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. See Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny the petition for review.

We disagree "with Vera-Morlas’ contention that the BIA’s order specifically limited the proceedings on remand and that the government therefore was barred from filing additional charges of removability on remand. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) (“At any time during the proceeding, additional or substituted charges of [removability] ... may be lodged”). In addition, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the government from filing additional charges of removability against Vera-Morlas because the BIA’s remand order is not a final judgment, rendered on the merits in a separate action. See Valencia-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 2006).

The agency properly found Vera-Morlas removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) by determining that his petty theft and grand theft convictions are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude. See United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petty theft constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1568 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that grand theft is a crime involving moral turpitude).

Vera-Morlas’ remaining contentions are unavailing.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.