MEMORANDUM *

Daniel Reyes appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of Pico-Rivera (the “City”) and Donald Gray-son in a stigma-plus procedural due process claim Reyes brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and, reviewing de novo, see, e.g., Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994), we affirm.

Although “[t]he termination of a public employee which includes publication of stigmatizing charges triggers due process protections,” Reyes was not entitled to a name-clearing hearing because “there [was][no] public disclosure of the charge.” Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 Grayson’s dissemination of an allegedly stigmatizing report to two City decision-makers did not, on its own, constitute publication, because there was no public disclosure. See Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1074 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the provision of the allegedly stigmatizing information to opposing counsel during discovery in a related lawsuit did not constitute publication, both because it lacked the “public” element contemplated by our stigma-plus cases, and because adopting such a rule would inhibit “forthright and truthful communication ... between litigants.” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). 2 Accordingly, because no reasonable trier of fact could find that the allegedly stigmatizing report was publicly disclosed, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City and Grayson. 3

AFFIRMED.