MEMORANDUM ***

Katherine Marie Gable appeals the district court’s revocation of her supervised release and imposition of a fourteen-month sentence. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we do not recount additional facts except as necessary to explain the decision. We affirm.

Admission of hearsay evidence during the revocation hearing did not violate Gable’s Fifth Amendment right to confrontation because the evidence was sufficiently reliable. See United States v. *973 Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United, States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, any error was harmless, because Gable challenges only evidence relevant to the fifth supervised release violation, and the district court stated that it would have revoked her release even if the fifth violation had not been considered.

The district court did not err in concluding that Gable had committed a new crime. A district court may revoke a term of supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Here, there was sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Gable had committed a new state-law crime in violation of the terms of her supervised release.

Nor did the district court improperly rely on punishment during sentencing. Taken in context, the court’s reference to “punishment” properly concerned sanctions for Gable’s supervised release violations, not for the underlying state-law crime. See United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).

Finally, Gable’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable considering the totality of the circumstances, see United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), because Gable’s supervised release had been revoked three times and her new violations commenced almost immediately after her release from prison.

AFFIRMED.