MEMORANDUM **

The government appeals the district court’s dismissal of its charge of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(l) against defendant Ronald Gaither (“Gaither”). The district court dismissed this count of the indictment because (1) the predicate offenses were not related to terrorism; and (2) the stolen identity belonged to a deceased victim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand.

First, the predicate charges brought against Gaither, bank fraud and theft of government funds, are expressly listed among those that serve as a basis *720 for an identity theft charge under § 1028A(a)(1). 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(c)(1), (5). The district coui-t’s belief that the statute applies only to terrorism-related offenses, rather than “straight bank fraud,” is plainly incorrect.

Second, Gaither’s argument that § 1028A(a)(1) does not criminalize the theft of identity documents belonging to a deceased person is foreclosed by United States v. Maciel-Alcala, 612 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that the term “person” as used in § 1028A(a)(1) includes both living and deceased persons. After the Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 1888-94, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) interpreted § 1028A(a)(l) so that the term “knowingly” modified all subsequently listed elements of the crime, including “of another person,” we were charged in Ma-ciel-Alcala with further interpreting the term “person” to make clear what exactly the defendant had to know. Contrary to Gaither’s argument, therefore, Maciel-Alcala’s holding that “person” in § 1028A(a)(1) includes both living and deceased persons is not merely dicta, but was the precise question under review. Although this case presents a different set of facts because the person whose identity Gaither stole was in fact dead at the time of the unlawful use, MacieUAlcala’s holding as to how § 1028A(a)(l) should be construed as a matter of law controls.

Because the district court’s reasoning is contrary to the plain text of the statute and our holding in United States v. Maciel-Alcala, 612 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010), its dismissal of the charge under § 1028A(a)(1) is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this disposition.