U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2011

Hashibo Lacy v. Mark Nooth

Hashibo Lacy v. Mark Nooth
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Decided July 1, 2011 · Fisher, Gould, Paez
441 F. App'x 472

Hashibo Lacy v. Mark Nooth

Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Petitioner Hashibo Lacy appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Lacy claims that the Oregon courts unreasonably applied Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), contending that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. But Lacy has not shown that “the state court’s ruling on [his] claim ... was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786-87, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). There is at least “a reasonable argument,” id. at 788, that Lacy’s conviction satisfies the Jackson standard. The Oregon courts reasonably could have determined that there was sufficient evidence that Lacy “use[d] or threatened] the immediate use of physical force” against Killam with the requisite intent. Or.Rev.Stat. § 164.395.

Because Lacy’s habeas petition does not raise a colorable federal claim, we need not reach the question of whether Lacy exhausted his state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a federal court may deny an unex-hausted habeas petition on the merits “when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim”).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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