*617 MEMORANDUM ***

Patrick Jones appeals his convictions arising out of his sexual exploitation of a fourteen-year-old child. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 1591. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Jones argues that our decision in United States v. U.S. District Court (Kantor II), 858 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1988), which explicated § 2251(a), does not dictate the answer to his claim that the section must require that recklessness be proved as a part of the government’s case. However, that decision is controlling on Jones’s statutory construction and constitutional claims. Id. at 537-44. While Jones attacks our decision in that case, we are bound by the decision 1 because no subsequent Supreme Court case has undermined Kantor IT's explicit and implicit statutory and constitutional determinations. 2 The district court did not err when it followed Kantor II.

Jones also argues that his conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1591 must be reversed because the jury was instructed on the statutory requirements as that statute existed at the time of trial, rather than those that existed when he committed his offense. He asserts, and the government agrees, that the ex post facto clause 3 was, therefore, violated. Thus, we will reverse that conviction and remand for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.