MEMORANDUM **

Appellants, Terrance Tucker (Terrance) and Sonya Tucker (Sonya) pled guilty to two counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2)(b). 1 They now assert *618 that the district court did not rule on their objections as to the loss amount, the district court did not adequately explain its reasoning, and that their sentences are unreasonable. Sonya also challenges the district court’s denial of her request for a continuance.

1. When determining monetary loss, the district court may utilize various methods, which do not have to be precise. See United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court based its loss calculation on “[pjresentence reports, all schedules and exhibits submitted by the parties, and the arguments of government counsel at the time of the hearing ...” The evidence upon which the district court relied included financial spreadsheets detailing the amount of loss. Because the district court may employ various methods to determine monetary loss, its estimate of loss was not clearly erroneous. See Berger, 587 F.3d at 1045.

2. The district court explained that it imposed the sentences because of Terrance and Sonya’s roles in the crimes, their knowledge of the industry, and their relationship with the victims. As the district court adequately explained its straightforward sentences that were within (Terrance) and below (Sonya) the Guidelines range, no procedural error occurred, including plain error in applying the number-of-victims adjustment. See United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Showalter, 569 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009) (permitting reliance on undisputed facts in the Presentence Report).

3. Relying on Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), Terrance asserted that there was a lack of empirical evidence to support application of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Just because a crime falls within a Kim-brough exception does not mean the district court must vary from the Guidelines. See United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, when the district court does not have a policy disagreement with the Guidelines, it is not obligated to apply a variance. See id.

The district court is not required to list in detail the § 3553(a) factors it considered. See Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d at 1053. As long as the record supports that the sentence imposed is logical and consistent with the § 3553(a) factors, the sentence is reasonable. See id. Terrance’s sentence was at the low end of the Guidelines range and Sonya’s was below the Guidelines range. Both were reasonable. See Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d at 1055 (explaining that a sentence within the Guidelines range is usually reasonable).

4. The district court has discretion to deny a continuance. See United States v. Kloehn, 620 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010). Because Sonya failed to establish any prejudice that resulted from the denial, there was no abuse of the court’s discretion. See id. at 1128.

AFFIRMED.