MEMORANDUM **

Glenna Jo Tramell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her employment action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Tramell’s action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it involved the same claims and parties as Tramell’s prior state court action that was decided on the merits. See Kay v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 504 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating requirements for res judicata under California law).

To the extent that Tramell contends that the state court decision was erroneous, the district court properly determined that those contentions are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments”).

Tramell’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.