Kimberly Dyer v. Tempe Municipal Court
Kimberly Dyer v. Tempe Municipal Court
Opinion
MEMORANDUM ***
Kimberly Anne Dyer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging that defendants and others have conspired against her for over a decade. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009). We review for plain error when a party raises the issue of judicial bias for the first time on appeal. United States v. Bosch, 951 F.2d 1546, 1548 (9th Cir. 1991). We affirm.
Dyer’s contention that the district court was biased fails because she does not point to any evidence in the record of judicial bias. See Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (test for disqualification of judge is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Commercial Paper Holders v. Hine (Matter of Beverly Hills Bancorp), 752 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[ujnfavorable rulings alone are legally insufficient to require recusal”).
We affirm for the reasons stated in district court’s orders entered October 29, 2010 and November 2, 2010.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.