MEMORANDUM **

Oregon state prisoner Brandon Maxfield appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force as barred by the statute of limitations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We *405 review de novo. Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred because Max-field filed it after the statute of limitations had run. See Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (“State law governs the statute of limitations period for § 1983 suits and closely related questions of tolling.”).

The district court properly rejected Maxfield’s equitable tolling argument because Oregon law does not allow tolling during periods of imprisonment. See Douglas, 567 F.3d at 1109.

The district court properly rejected Maxfield’s equitable estoppel argument because Maxfield failed to allege a basis for estoppel. See Philpott v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 710 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1983) (for equitable estoppel to apply, there must be an affirmative inducement by defendant that delayed plaintiff from timely filing suit).

AFFIRMED.