MEMORANDUM **

G. Mark Crisp and Rhonda Crisp appeal pro se from the district court’s order of judicial sale in the government’s action to reduce to judgment federal income tax assessments against them and to foreclose on federal tax liens to satisfy the judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1970), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order of judicial sale to enforce a judgment against the Crisps, including by imposing reasonable terms and conditions on the Crisps to maintain the properties at issue in good condition pending the sale and to vacate the property they occupied before the sale. See 26 U.S.C. § 7403(e) (authorizing district court to decree a sale of property subject to federal tax lien according to its findings regarding the interests of all parties); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2001 (authorizing district court to order any sales of real property “upon such terms and conditions as the court directs”). Moreover, the district court’s instructions that the Crisps refrain from publishing notices or taking other actions that might adversely affect the value of the properties or discourage potential bidders burdened no more speech than necessary to serve the government’s significant interest in enforcing federal tax laws. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (content-neutral injunction does not violate First Amendment if “the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest”).

We decline to address the Crisps’ arguments regarding Wanda Crisp because she is not a party to this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(2) (“A pro se notice of appeal is considered filed on behalf of the signer and the signer’s spouse and minor *749 children (if they are parties), unless the notice clearly indicates otherwise.”).

AFFIRMED.