MEMORANDUM **

Terry Franklin appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for post-indictment dely, the district court’s denial of his suppression motion, and his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). We affirm the district court on all three matters.

Franklin’s motion to dismiss was based on the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In this case, the length and reasons for delay do not excuse Franklin from showing actual, non-speculative prejudice. See United States v. Beamon, 992 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e must consider the amount of delay in relation to particularized prejudice.”). Franklin cannot show that his trial’s delay caused him such prejudice. As a result, the delay between Franklin’s indictment, arrest, and trial did not violate his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights. We affirm the district court’s denial of Franklin’s motion to dismiss.

We also affirm the district court’s denial of Franklin’s suppression motion. We find that the circumstances created reasonable suspicion for an “investigatory stop,” or Terry stop, of Franklin. See Hiibel v. *630 Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004). The accompanying frisk was appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, for the reasons enumerated by the district court, we affirm Franklin’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). United States v. Franklin, CR 07-967 PSG, 2011 WL 3424448 (C.D.Cal. Aug.5, 2011).